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AUTOPOIETIC LAW: THE NEW SCIENCE 
OF NIKLAS LUHMANN 
Arthur J. Jacobson* 
AUTOPOIETIC LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO LAW AND SOCIETY •. Ed-
ited by Giinther Teubner. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 1988. Pp. viii, 
380. $98. 
The publication of Autopoietic Law: A New Approach. to Law and 
Society, edited by Gunther Teubner, 1 is an event of real intellectual 
importance. The fifteen essays by legal theorists from throughout the 
world mark the appearance of a novel paradigm in legal theory - the 
biological model of autopoiesis. They also make a Festschrift of sorts 
for Niklas Luhmann, a brilliant expositor of the paradigm. Though 
the name - and some of the prose - is quite forbidding, common 
lawyers should be keenly interested in this collection. Autopoiesis, af-
ter all, is the first image of law drawn from science that comes even 
close to revealing the secrets of common law's own harsh discipline. 
"Autopoiesis" means "self-production." Biologists and systems 
theorists use the term to describe a self-referential system - one that 
"constitutes the elements of which it consists through the elements of 
which it consists" (p. 14). The core image of autopoiesis is the individ-
ual organism, ceaselessly generating elements out of elements, forming 
each element into an indissoluble unity from a m'ore complex base of 
energy and matter (p. 14). Every element of an autopoietic system is 
produced by and produces the operations of the system. All elements 
are produced means of reproducing the system. Elements that do not 
join the circular dance of autopoiesis are outside the system, part of its 
environment. They may affect elements in the system or be affected by 
them, but play no role in the operations reproducing the system. 
Autopoiesis is a new way of understanding the independence and au-
tonomy - the operative "closure" - of systems. 2 
Autopoietic law models the legal systems of advanced industrial 
.: Max Freund Professor of Litigation and Advocacy, Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva Uni-
versity. B.A. 1969, Harvard College; J.D. 1974, Harvard University; Ph.D. Government 1978, 
Harvard GSAS. - Ed. J'hanks to Drucilla Cornell and Chuck Yablon for their special encour-
agement. Thanks also to Eric Bregman, David Carlson, Mark Gould, John Leubsdorf, Peninah 
Petruck, Michel Rosenfeld, and Stewart Sterk for their insightful comments. Dave Trubek 
opened the door to autopoiesis, for me and many others, in the Conference on Reflexive Law and 
the Regulatory Crisis, at the University of Wisconsin Law School, July 18-21, 1983. 
1. European University Institute, Ser. A, Law 8. 
2. P. 15 ("closure consists in the fact that all operations always reproduce the system"). 
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democracies as if they were self-reproducing organisms.3 The core im-
age of autopoietic law is: (1) a legal system ceaselessly generating (and 
transforming) legal materials entirely out of legal materials; hence, (2) 
a legal system continuously setting (and altering) the conditions of its 
own validity (pp. 17-18). Politics, morality, and many other nonlegal 
forces certainly affect law in autopoietic legal systems - how could 
they not? - but they do not determine the validity of legal acts and 
communications. 
Legal theorists have two distinct interests in autopoietic law. The 
first is the dynamism of autopoietic law, stemming from the first part 
of the core image. The legal systems of advanced industrial democra-
cies constantly generate and transform law in every legal act and com-
munication. A perpetual motion of norms sharply distinguishes 
certain legal systems. Autopoiesis is a wonderful image for a system 
dynamically generating and transforming its own elements. Auto-
poietic law expresses the essential dynamism of certain modem legal 
systems more effectively than any prior theory.4 
The second interest is the unity of autopoietic law, stemming from 
the second part of the core image. Despite the extraordinary concep-
tual and practical demands the administrative state has made on them, 
modem legal systems still claim that legality confers a special brand of 
validity.5 Though deeply affected by the political and moral exigencies 
of administration, modem legal systems claim that they do not "de-
compose" to the forces that affect them (pp. 14-15). Though dynamic, 
modem legal systems still claim to be coherent in the sense that a 
denizen of the system can at any moment determine the validity of a 
legal act or statement according to whether it has been produced by 
operations of the system.6 The denizen at all times knows the system's 
operations and the possible results of those operations. Modem legal 
systems thus do not abandon the claim to substantive coherence, as 
3. Autopoietic law is not meant to be a description of all legal systems. The empirical claim 
is that autopoietic law serves as an appropriate model for the legal systems of advanced industrial 
democracies. 
4. One of Kelsen's greatest achievements was to be the first legal positivist to model the 
dynamic character of modem legal systems. See H. KELSEN, The Dynamic Aspect of Law, in 
PURE THEORY OF LAW 193-278 (1970) (published as the Reine Rechts/ehre in 1934). 
5. Legal theorists differ sharply on the meaning of "validity." Legal sociologists, such as 
Luhmann, attempt to clarify the terms of the debate by correlating criteria of validity with spe-
cific types of legal systems. That a legal system must use some criterion of validity is probable. 
Though I shall not explore the subject in depth here, autopoietic law does claim a criterion of 
validity for autopoietic legal systems - a binary code by which denizens of the system can say 
whether an act or communication is "legal" or "illegal." See pp. 16, 23-26. 
6. Autopoietic law asserts that the criterion of validity need not be stable, or even expressible 
in rules or maxims available for ready restatement. Nor does autopoietic law require that only 
one legal act or statement be valid at any single moment. Nonetheless, denizens can at any 
moment recognize the validity of legal acts and statements, which is all autopoiesis requires. For 
a compelling criticism of the doctrine of time embedded in this notion of validity, see Cornell, 
Time, Deconstruction, and the Challenge to Legal Positivism, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMANITIES -
(1989) (forthcoming) [hereinafter Cornell, Legal Positivism]. 
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legal positivism suggests they must. Yet because modem legal systems 
are dynamic, no one can point to a single, rationally expressible es-
sence capturing the substantive coherence. Autopoietic law asserts 
that legal systems can be substantively coherent, despite the lack of a 
single, rationally expressible essence (p. 21). Autopoiesis proclaims 
the dynamic substantive coherence - the "unity" - of the legal sys-
tem in its sustaining control over its own operations (pp. 13-14, 18, 23-
26). The system is autonomous, because it "can neither derive its oper-
ations from its environment nor pass them on to that environment" (p. 
18). 
My criticism of Niklas Luhmann's construction of autopoietic law7 
is that he favors the second interest, the operative unity of modem 
legal systems and their autonomy from the environment, at the ex-
pense of the first, the dynamism of these systems. 8 Luhmann pre-
serves the autonomy of autopoietic legal systems by insisting that they 
are closed only to legal norms, but open to information from the sys-
tem's social environment. This formula, normatively closed and cog-
nitively open, draws the teeth of autopoietic law. It makes autopoietic 
law into fancy positivism coupled with covert naturalism - the static 
theories of law - rather than an account of law and society that is 
sensitive to traces of dynamism. While various mixtures of fancy posi-
tivism with covert naturalism are endemic in modem legal theory,9 
they are by no means analytically inevitable or politically desirable. 
Two difficulties with Luhmann's formulation drive him to positiv-
ism and naturalism. First, autopoiesis itself, as Luhmann is aware, 
may not be transferable from individual organisms to social systems 
(p. 14). So long as Luhmann treats the social system as a super-indi-
vidual, for which autopoiesis is more than an attractive metaphor in 
the manner of Hobbes' Leviathan, then the key to autopoiesis, the real 
individual, will be missing. The absence of real individuals leads 
Luhmann to legal theories that likewise marginalize the individual, 
namely positivism and naturalism. 
Second, assuming it is possible to use autopoiesis to describe the 
7. I am deeply aware that autopoietic law, as all real intellectual undertakings, has been an 
intensely social project. I find it an unfortunate consequence of the limits of energy (and, un-
doubtedly, the patience of the editors of the Michigan Law Review) that I focus on Luhmann to 
the virtual exclusion of the other extraordinary contributors to Autopoietic Law. I owe a special 
apology to Giinther Teubner, who has been developing his own brand of autopoietic law, fully as 
rich and instructive as Luhmann's. See, e.g., Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in 
Modem Law, 17 LAW & Socv. REv. 239 (1983); Teubner, Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A 
Rejoinder to Blankenburg, 18 LAW & Socv. REv. 291 (1984). 
8. Luhmann's concern with autonomy at the expense of dynamism, while recognizing the 
prevalence of dynamism in modern legal systems, goes back at least to his 1976 lecture to the 
Gilttingen Rechtswissenschaftliche Gesel/schaft. See N. LUHMANN, The Autonomy of the Legal 
System, in THE DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIETY 122 (1982) [hereinafter N. LUHMANN, 
DIFFERENTIATION]. 
9. This is especially true for common law theorists, who cannot compress their tradition 
within plain positivism or plain naturalism. 
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social system as if it were an individual organism, it is difficult to imag-
ine how a subsystem of the social system can itself be autopoietic 
within the autopoiesis of the entire social system. 10 The legal system 
can be autopoietic in its own right only if a subsystem - a discrete 
social system serving a function within another social system - can be 
autopoietic. If a subsystem cannot be autopoietic, then the legal sys-
tem can be autopoietic only as part and parcel of the autopoiesis of the 
rest of society. The legal system would then be dynamic, but not au-
tonomous. The formula, normatively closed and cognitively open, re-
flects Luhmann's functional confinement of the legal system within an 
autopoietic subsystem. The claim that a legal system is an autopoietic 
subsystem thus stands or falls on Luhmann's ability to distinguish be-
tween "normative" and "cognitive." This is an empirical distinction 
Luhmann cannot validate, though he is correct that the autonomy of 
the legal system depends on it. 11 The common law exemplifies the 
empirical difficulties besetting the distinction. It also puts in question 
the claim that other legal systems, such as the Continental systems 
with which Luhmann is undoubtedly more familiar, successfully dis-
tinguish between "normative" and "cognitive," and hence are auto-
poietically autonomous. Failing clear empirical validation of the 
distinction, Luhmann's formula, and the functional confinement of the 
legal system it presumes, constitute a normative choice or orientation 
on Luhmann's part. The ~ormative choice to distinguish between 
"normative" and "cognitive" leads Luhmann, once again, into a mix-
ture of positivism and naturalism. 
Luhmann is not alone in this choice. Modem legal theorists mix 
positivism and naturalism whenever they wish to confine legal systems 
within a functionally defined subsystem of the social system. 
Luhmann works in a theoretical tradition that regards legal systems 
that are coordinate with the entire social system as "fundamentalist" 
or "primitive." The common law is coordinate with the entire social 
system. However, it is neither "fundamentalist" nor "primitive." It 
supports an advanced industrial democracy. 
My criticism thus takes the perspective of a denizen of common 
law - the legal system of an advanced industrial democracy. Presum-
ably Luhmann is interested in autonomy because he believes that au-
tonomy of the legal system facilitates the development and functioning 
of advanced industrial democracies. To sustain his claims about au-
tonomy, Luhmann must be able to show that common law systems 
satisfy his empirical claims about autopoiesis. In particular, the com-
10. Luhmann is also aware of this problem. See p. 19. 
11. Luhmann admits that as an empirical matter every operation in law uses normative and 
cognitive operations simultaneously. He makes fascinating and important theoretical statements 
about the simultaneity, but the differentiation of the two, given their inevitable empirical coinci· 
dence, is surely not capable of empirical validation. See p. 20. 
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mon law must vindicate the formula, normatively closed and cogni-
tively open, which expresses Luhmann's analytic emphasis on unity 
and autonomy at the expense of dynamism. 
As Richard Lempert argues in his contribution to the volume, the 
common law does not empirically validate Luhmann's formula (pp. 
178-82). Therefore, the interest of common law theorists in auto-
poietic law must be the reverse of Luhmann's interest. The common 
law is vitally concerned with dynamism for its own sake, not as a de-
fensive response to the needs of autonomy and unity. Dynamism, I 
suggest, is a virtue more hospitable to advanced industrial democracy 
than are unity and autonomy. 
The price of dynamism is undoubtedly a loss of intellectual coher-
ence and perfect autonomy - a rejection of functional confinement. 
Nevertheless, the key to the common .law as a .dyp.amic jurisprudencei 
which it shares with a whole family of dynamic jurisprudence,. is ex,. 
actly the individualism that autopoiesis attempts to model. 12 The indi-
vidual living in a dynamic legal system uses it to draw on the resources 
of society to perfect his or her individuality, not to mediate b_etween a 
calculating will and the demands of society .. Luhmann's discussjon of 
the motor driving autopoietic law, by contrast, is a story of tautology 
rescued by utility .(pp. 22, 26-28). A common law understanding of 
autopoietic law - autopoiesis through, rather than over, the heads of 
real individuals - may ultimately shed light on the general auto-
poietic account of social systems. ' . . 
My disagreement with Luhmann centers on the stakes I believe he 
places on the key theoretical propositions of autopoiesis. For 
Luhmann, the possibility of an autonomous legal system is at stake, 
despite the obvious fact that politics and morality infuse legal decision-
making in advanced industrial dein9cracies. As Luhmann sees it, if 
autopoiesis is a correct description of legal systems in advanced indus-
trial democracies, then law can make good the claim to provide a fixed 
point, a reliable standard for citizens in these democracies to use in 
daily interactions. From Luhmann's perspective, if autopoiesis · is 
wrong, then the legal system seemingly must succumb, like the market 
or even the family, to the perpetual warfare over politics and morality 
that citizens of democracies at once lament and celebrate. 
My perspective is different. Politics and morality do not destroy 
the legal systems of advanced industrial democracies. It is not a mark 
of success for these legal systems to be able to claim that they are 
intellectually coherent, hence autonomous from the "nonlegal" pres-
sures of politics and morality. Law in these systems can be another 
way of playing politics, another arena in which citizens engage in 
12. See Jacobson, Hegel's Legal Plenum, 10 CARDOZO L. R.Ev. 877 (198~) [hereinafter 
Jacobson, Legal Plenum]. 
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moral disputation. 13 The reverse is also true. It is hard to fathom how 
any politics or moral disputation can function, even in principle, in a 
universe devoid of legality. The idea is nonsense, inconceivable. 
Hence, the project of protecting the legal system from a "nonlegal" 
politics or morality is a false project. Practicing lawyers in common 
law systems know this truth. Legal scholars, fascinated by the same 
models of jurisprudence that beset Luhmann, often forget it. 
My disagreement with Luhmann also centers on the definition of 
elements bearing the system's autopoiesis. Luhmann maintains that 
the autopoietic elements of the legal system are legal norms defined as 
congruently generalized behavioral expectations (p. 27). Luhmann's 
definition thus deprives legal norms of any reference to real individu-
als. Luhmann dumps everything real about individuals into the cogni-
tive part of the legal system, the exact part that is not autopoietically 
closed according to Luhmann's formula. The common law, by con-
trast, gives the real individual a role in the content of norms, not just 
in stating the content. The individual is a necessary normative refer-
ence. The legal norm does not stand apart from its maker. To know 
the norm is to know prior, present, and future applications of the 
norm by ordinary legal persons.14 The norm is the application of the 
norm. It is not prior to application. ts 
Finally, my disagreement with Luhmann may be expressed as an 
uncertainty, or skepticism, that scientific models such as autopoiesis 
can fully capture the strong individualism of the common law. 
Luhmann works in a tradition heavily influenced by positivism and 
naturalism. These schools of jurisprudence use images of science that 
have no room for individuality. By looking to autopoiesis, one of the 
new sciences of the individual, as a model for legal theory, Luhmann 
tries to ameliorate the lack of dynamism and unity that have tradition-
ally affiicted positivist and naturalist theories. Yet in the end, 
Luhmann sinks back into the very models autopoiesis was meant to 
ameliorate. The simultaneous attraction that positivism and natural-
ism exercise on legal theorists is immensely powerful. Perhaps we do 
not yet have an adequate scientific model of individuality to ward off 
that attraction. 
13. Roberto Unger's conception of "expanded discourse" captures this idea. See Unger, The 
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1983). Unger is fighting a dominant 
mood in the American legal academy, the bureaucratic legal theory of the generation of legal 
academics that came of age in the 1950s. He would find widespread agreement with his concep· 
tion in most law offices. 
14. Drucilla Cornell's attack on Luhmann runs along these lines. See Cornell, Legal Positiv· 
ism, supra note 6. 
15. Positivism and naturalism hold, each in their different yet complementary ways, that the 
norm is prior to application of the norm. Luhmann claims to agree that lawmaking and law· 
applying can never, even in principle, be distinguished. P. 345. Nevertheless, the structure of his 
model, sharply distinguishing normative from cognitive ways of handling disappointed expecta· 
tions, may lead him into the very distinction he denies. 
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Nonetheless, legal theory has a powerful account of individuality 
in a different tradition: law as revelation has strong models of individ-
uals. At the very least, revelatory law is worth exploring as a possible 
model for dynamic (and often nonsacred) legal systems, in which the 
individual as such plays a leading role. The common law puts individ-
uals at the center of the legal system, and possesses recognizable reve-
latory moments. Law as revelation has never used scientific models. 
Part I of this Book Review explores some ties between the non-
revelatory traditions of Western jurisprudence and the preindividualist 
models of science available to these traditions up to the end of the 
nineteenth century. Part II describes the new sciences of the individ-
ual, which began to dominate science at the turn of the century. These 
included, at first, developments in physiCs · and psychology, and 
Weber's social science. Autopoiesis too is a science of the individual, 
as Part III shows, with precursors in economics and legal theory. Part 
IV describes Luhmann's vision of autopoietic law and the model of 
society as communication anchoring it. Part V argues that Luhmann 
has retreated from the vision of autopoietic law in order to emphasize 
the autonomy of legal systems, albeit at the cost of their dynamism. 
Part VI presents a common law response to the retreat, emphasizing 
the centrality of dynamism in the legal system of at least one advanced 
industrial democracy. The discussion of dynamism in the common 
law turns us to the revelatory tradition. 
I. CONTINENTAL JURISPRUDENCE AND PRE-INDIVIDUALIST 
SCIENCE 
Science has always been a source of powerful metaphors for West-
ern jurisprudence.16 Apart from revelation, the two other main tradi-
tions of legal thought, legal positivism and naturalism, stick closely to 
one of the two scientific traditions that were dominant in the West 
through the middle of the nineteenth century. 
Legal positivism always rests upon the physicists' model of mecha-
nism. Naturalism adopts some version of the biology of species (or 
essences) that marks pre-modern organic science. Particular theories, 
such as Hobbes' Leviathan, 17 have inevitably joined these models in 
fabulous and instructive mixtures. Nevertheless, these two models, 
16. D'Entreves attributes the constant attraction oflegal theory to "nature," for example, to 
"the quest after some immutable standard or pattern, independent of ... choice and capable of 
carrying conviction." A. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW 16 (2d ed. 1970). 
Patrick Nerhot's, The Fact of Law discusses and criticizes the link between legal positivism 
and positivist science. Pp. 312-34. Many of his observations are similar to mine, especially his 
emphasis on the mutual dependence of positivism and naturalism, the dynamism of the legal 
system, and the necessity of recentering values and individuals in legal theory. Alas, he is not 
familiar with common law. 
On the link between law and science in American legal theory, see Yablon, Law and Meta-
physics (Book Review), 96 YALE L.J. 613, at 620-22 (1987). 
17. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C. MacPherson, ed. 19~1) (1st ed. 1651). 
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mechanism and the biology of species, practically defined the images 
legal theorists drew upon to describe the ways and means of nonreve-
latory law and legal institutions. 
A. Legal Positivism and Mechanism 
Legal positivism is the doctrine that persons can know law solely 
by reference to the procedure by which it is marked as law, or promul-
gated. A key problem in positivist systematics is accounting for the 
source of the procedure. Some forms of positivism attribute the source 
to the agreement of persons to be governed by laws promulgated ac-
cording to the procedure.18 Others develop a procedural naturalism, 
whereby a rational observer: perceives the procedure. Perceived proce-
dures often accompany a natural morality. 19 At least one branch of 
positivism, therefore, reduces to a naturalism of procedure. The other 
also remits to naturalism, however, in the question: How do we know 
when persons agree?20 Thus positivism always requires a naturalist 
practice, at least whenever the procedural mechanism is beset by con-
flict or disorder. 
Positivism draws two simple images from mechanism.21 The first 
is the static image of order (inertia). The second is the kinetic image 
of control (impressed forces). Positive law describes a procedure, a 
mechanism, whereby an observer is able to understand the order estab-
lished by "orders'~ emanating from the procedure, and to control legal 
subjects (the masses) by enforcement of the orders (the forces). 
Legal positivism also shares a deep methodological kinship with 
the methods of experimental science, of which mechanism is a 
supreme example. (The method of the pre-modem biology of species 
and naturalism is observation, not experiment.) The way of knowing 
through experiment r~sembles the positivist account of legislation. 
Laws are the subject of knowledge in both experimental science and 
positivist juP,sprudence. The experimenter and the jurisprude come to 
know laws in a similar manner. Laws are not "found" (as observa-
tions are fo~nd in the pre-modern, biology of species or in naturalism), 
but are "put there" by, acts of will. 
Experiment requires two acts of will. The first is the exercise of 
will in. making a theory. The theory contains a description of an initial 
state in terms of categories, together with a description of laws of mo-
tion amongst the categories. These descriptions are an act of will on 
the part of the experimenter, since the categories and the law of mo-
tion amongst them have heuristic value only. (The experimenter does 
-· 
18. See, e.g., id. 
19. See, e.g., L. FUUER,,THE MORALITY OF LAW 81-82 (1964). 
20. See Hobbes' crucial discussion of conscience in chapter 7 of his LEVIATHAN, supra note 
17. 
21. See generally E. NAGEL, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENCE, 153-202 (1961). 
May 1989] Autopoietic Law 1655 
not claim to know the essence or real being of nature through the 
categories and laws of motion.) The second act of will is empirical. 
The empirical act of will is to intervene in the initial state, checking 
that the actual categorical changes in the state match the changes pre-
dicted by the laws of motion. The validity of the theory depends upon 
the coincidence of the first act of will with the second: the laws of 
motion described in the theory with the actual state produced by the 
intervention. 
Similarly, legal validity in positivism flows from the coincidence of 
two acts of will. The first act of will in positivism is the promulgation 
of laws by the legislator. Promulgation of laws closely resembles the 
theory-making act of will in experimental science. Positivist legisla-
tion at once describes behavior in terms of legal categories, and sets 
the legal laws of motion - the orders backed by sanctions - amongst 
the categories. The second act of will is the decision of subjects of law 
to follow or not to follow the orders, the legal laws of motion. Legal 
validity flows from a coincidence of the subjects' decisions (whether 
following orders or triggering sanctions) with legislation. 
Finally, both legislator and experimenter-as-theorist in the first 
acts of will are apart from or "outside" the material they wish to con-
trol. Both legal subject and experimenter-as-intervenor in the second 
acts of will are "connected to" the controlled materials, but are still 
only tentatively or hypothetically "inside" them. Both legislator and 
legal subject, therefore, have external orientations toward legal norms. 
There is never a coincidence of maker of norms and subject of norms. 
Norms are just "there," instruments of control or subjection, entirely 
external to all persons in the positivist legal universe. 
B. Naturalism and the Biology of Species 
Naturalism is the doctrine that the source of law is the perceptions 
of a: rational observer. The key problem in naturalism is'the qualifica-
tion of the observer as "rational." When conflict inevitably arises over 
the qualifications of competing observers, naturalism remits to proce'.. 
dural marks of rationality. Thus naturalism req'1ires a positivist prac-· 
tice when the project of locating' a natural essence is beset by conflict 
or disorder. 
Naturalism draws the image of a rationally perceivable essence -
law as substance - froni the biology of species, which is wholly open 
to the perceptions'of a rational observer.22 "Biology of sp~cies" refers 
to any biology that uses "species," however defined, as the building 
block of the organic, or even inorganic, world.23 "Individuals" are 
22. See A. o'ENTREVES, supra note 16, at 65-78. 
23. See E. MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT, 251-98 (1982). On the differ-
ence between mechanistic and biological explanation, see E. NAGEL, supra note 21, at 398-446 
(biological explanation is usually teleological; mechanistic explanation is not). 
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merely the instruments or bearers of the life of the species. Character-
istics borne by individuals may or may not capture the species charac-
teristic in this biology (as, for example, individual bees - workers, 
drones, queen - do not, taken one by one, capture the species charac-
teristic - the hive life - of bees). The biology of species (possibly 
always) formulates the scientific "explanation" of a phenomenon as an 
essence, which can be adequately perceived through correct observa-
tion. The technique, and therefore the content, of observation varies, 
of course, from one version of the biology of species to another. None-
theless, the assertion in this scientific method is that sheer observation 
can plumb the depths of reality. 
The biology of species, unlike experimental science, has no simple 
test of validity. Similarly, natural law has no clear test, unlike legal 
positivism. The tests of validity, such as they are, stem either from 
esthetic intellectual criteria (fitness, elegance, etc.) or from the degree 
to which the actual life of the species fulfills a purpose the observer 
assigns to the species, an esthetic practical criterion flowing from the 
observer's teleology. Failure of a species or group to pass either sort of 
criterion is chalked up to disease or deformity. Hence legal systems 
premised on naturalism tend to regard sanctions as either the cure of 
moral disease or, in the most serious cases of deformity, eradication of 
the diseased creature. 
II. THE NEW SCIENCES OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
Prior to this century, only philosophers and theologians attempted 
to discuss the individual as such. Scientists spoke about species or 
categories, not individuals. The approach to the individual as such, 
both as observer of events and as event observed, is a hallmark of 
twentieth-century science.24 Autopoiesis uses the language of science 
to talk about individuals as such, not as members of species or in-
stances of categories. It is the most recent addition to the new sciences 
of the individual, in y.rhich truth flows from individuals interacting 
with individuals, rather than from species and categories in the mind 
of God.25 
Autopoiesis thus depends upon shifts in scientific method that be-
gan replacing both mechanism and the biology of species as long ago 
24. Like most generalizations, this one begs to be challenged. For example, some eighteenth· 
century biologists spoke of individuals rather than species. See E. MAYR, supra note 23, at 263· 
65. Nevertheless, only twentieth-century science has made the points of view of the individual 
thematic in several branches of science. 
25. Stephen Hawking's new book is a model of honest scientific deliberation on the place of 
God in scientific theories. s. HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME (1988). For example, he 
describes the relative latitude Laplace, the arch-determinist, gave to God's operations. Id. at 
172. Hawking himself believes that we can come to know the mind of God through understand· 
ing the mechanisms of the universe. Id. at 175. 
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as the middle of the nineteenth century.26 The new discoveries re-
placed mechanism first with statistical mechanics, then in tum with 
the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. 27 They discarded the 
method of essences for a biology of individuals, as a consequence pri-
marily28 of Darwin's theory of evolution.29 
The "biology of individuals," by contrast to the biology of species, 
looks to individuals as the building blocks of the organic, or even inor-
ganic, worlds. Darwin's evolutionary biology, which demonstrated 
above all the temporality of species, rendered the whole project of per-
ceiving essences untenable (essences probably have to be eternal). The 
focus had to be on characteristics of individuals and interchanges 
among individuals. The "species," from this perspective, could only 
be either a summary description of interchanges or the isolation of 
specific interchange mechanisms, such as language for humans. Only 
evolution makes the biology of species untenable. Darwin's scientific 
predecessors, like the medieval Nominalists, could only assert the im-
possibility of divining essences; they had not scientifically shown it. 30 
The replacements for mechanism, just like the biology of individu-
als, also forced scientists to consider the role of individuals in forming 
reality, both as objects of scientific scrutiny and as the scientist-sub-
jects carrying on the scrutiny. Statistical mechanics makes explicit the 
abstraction of classical mechanics' description of "forces moving 
masses." Instead of "forces moving masses," statistical mechanics of-
26. It is characteristic of the conservatism of lawyers, even "radical" lawyers, that legal the-
ory had to wait so long for this reflection. Ideas do not exactly travel at the speed of light in legal 
theory. 
27. See 1 A. D'ABRO, THE RISE OF THE NEW PHYSICS 101-05 (1951) (first published in 
1939 as Decline of Mechanism). See also E. SEGRE, FROM FALLING BODIES TO RADIO WAVES: 
CLASSICAL PHYSICISTS AND THEIR DISCOVERIES 233-51 (1984) [hereinafter E. SEGRE, CLASSI-
CAL PHYSICISTS]; E. SEGRE, FROM X-RAYS TO QUARKS: MODERN PHYSICISTS AND THEIR 
DISCOVERIES 61-100 (1980). 
28. But not exclusively. The way had been prepared by Hegel. The biology of individuals 
forms a basic theme of his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) and Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1817). 
However, Hegel's scientific method had no effect, so far as I know, on the developments in 
science or legal theory that I am describing. The intellectual history would be worth exploring. 
29. See E. MAYR, supra note 23, at 251-97. 
30. Montesquieu - like Luhmann and Weber, a lawyer turned social scientist - prefigured 
the study of populations in the twenty-third book of his Spirit of the Laws, "Of Laws in the 
Rapport They Have with the Number of Inhabitants," (published in 1748 as De /'Esprit des 
Lois). Durkheim's elaboration of Montesquieu's population theory was published in 1893 as the 
Division du Travail Social. See E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY [hereinaf-
ter E. DURKHEIM, DIVISION OF LABOR] 256-82 (1964). The centrality of populations to biologi-
cal theory was not at all understood until 1896 at the earliest. See E. MAYR, supra note 23, at 
272. We shall see another instance where social science anticipated a development in biological 
theory, in autopoiesis! See infra note 57. 
Hypothetically, one may pinpoint the joinder of Hegel's metaphysical biology of individuals 
with scientific theorizing in the work of the American pragmatists, particularly C.S. Peirce, in 
the late nineteenth century. His "science of signs" is an attempt to talk about the specific in-
terchange mechanism of humans. See J. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 
91-112 (1971) (first published as Erkentnisse und Interesse in 1968). 
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fers probabilities that an observer will find components of matter, 
however defined, at a spectrum of points in space-time.31 Relativity 
and quantum mechanics force inclusion of perspectives or actions of 
the observer as part and parcel of observation. Quantum mechanics 
asserts that observation sets or distills the observed phenomenon from 
a fundamentally "nonobservable" substrate, one that is probablistic in 
nature. 32 Thus a common theme expressed both in the decline of 
mechanism and in the substitution of the biology of individuals for the 
biology of species is the role of the individual, both as subject and 
object, in the scientific account of reality.33 
Durkheim represents a transitional figure in the application of the 
methods of individualist science to social life. Durkheim's method is 
sheer observation. 34 Though the method is substantially similar to the 
methods of pre-modern species science, the object of observation in-
cludes individuals as well as species. 35 Even so, Durkheim's method 
does not require reference to the observer's perspective, hence any 
conversation between observer and object of observation.36 Max 
Weber developed the first fully individualist methodology in social sci-
ence, shortly after Durkheim's work, requiring reference to the con-
sciousness of the observer and a conversation between the observer 
and the observed. 37 
31. Statistical mechanics thus joined the evolutionary theory of populations as a latecomer to 
Montesquieu's derivation of aggregate characteristics from populations. Ludwig Boltzmann in-
troduced the formative distinction of statistical mechanics between the average in time on a 
single molecule and an instant average over many molecules (and proved the equality of these 
distinct concepts) only in 1871. See E. SEGRE, CLASSICAL PHYSICISTS, supra note 27, at 242. 
32. See generally H. PAGELS, THE CoSMIC CODE 17-190 (1982). 
33. I have deliberately not discussed the new science of chaos, which incorporates both no-
tions of self-organization and self-similarity through iteration of recursive functions over all ele-
ments of a set. Though autopoiesis undoubtedly belongs to the science of chaos, neiiher the 
science nor my knowledge of it is sufficiently developed for me to tie the two together. James 
Gleick reports that some physicists regard chaos theory as the third great revolution of twenti-
eth-century science, after relativity and quantum mechanics. All three chip away at the 
Newtonian foundation of mechanics: relativity at the absolute Galilean frame of reference, quan-
tum mechanics at absolute measure, and chaos at Laplacean determinism. See J. GLEICK, 
Chaos: Making a New Science 5-6 (1987). One branch of chaos theory, Benoit Mandelbrot's 
theory of fractional dimensions, emphasizes the relativity of measure with respect to scale, as 
compared with relativity's acceleration and quantum mechanic's position. Mandelbrot has em-
phasized the kinship of his ideas with the twentieth-century emphasis on the perspective of the 
observer. See id. at 97. 
34. See E. DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD 12 (8th ed. 1938) (published 
as Les reg/es de la methode sociologique in 1895). 
35. See id. at 6-13. 
36. Durkheim's use of the comparative method may be a substitute for Weber's method of 
understanding through conversation. See infra text accompanying notes 111-13. 
37. See M. WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1949) (the earliest essay 
was published in 1904). For a more elaborate discussion of Weber's method, which is the start-
ing point today for all social inquiry, see infra text accompanying notes 111-13. But see infra 
note 113. Anthony Kronman has emphasized the will-centered, hence individualistic, element of 
Weber's methodology. See A. KRONMAN, MAX WEBER 6-36 (1983). Kronman ties Weber's 
individualism to his positivism. I believe this misconstrues the revolutionary implications em-
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The most thoroughgoing science of the individual, Freud's dy-
namic psychology, uses methods clearly reflecting the milieu in which 
Weber's social science, modem biology, and the new physics flour-
ished. 38 Only the goal of dynamic psychology differs: the empirical 
realization of the freedom of the individual, which philosophy, polit-
ical theory, and law assign to the individual only in principle. The 
technique of the empirical realization of freedom bears a striking re-
semblance to the technique of the other sciences of the individual in 
the empirical realization of truth: a cooperative communicative inter-
action in the interest of self-knowledge. Only recently has a social 
theorist, Jiirgen Habermas, attempted to follow Freud's program in 
the three fields against which Freud developed his dynamic psychol-
ogy. Durkheim and Weber used individualist methods in the interests 
of knowledge. Habermas uses them, like Freud, in the interests of 
freedom. Habermas' effort has been critically important in 
Luhmann's invention of autopoietic law.39 
The test of validity in the new sciences of the individual is the 
health of the individual. Health, in tum, is broken down into various 
notions of functional efficiency. Since the biology of individuals lacks 
any teleology or canon of intellectual elegance, the degree to which the 
subject of observation fulfills a moral purpose or satisfies an esthetic 
vision cannot be defined by these scientists. Nor do they express an 
interest in control through experiment. Health - the efficient func-
tioning of the organism - uses criteria established by the organism 
itself. Thus the scientist of individuals necessarily enters into a con-
versation with the object of observation. The observations of the sci-
entist serve not to control the organism, but to suggest or create 
conditions in which the organism can maximize functional efficiency 
as the organism defines it, or to assist the organism in changing its 
functional criterion, its canon of health. Some scientists of the individ-
ual have used a physical or objective version of the test <;>f health that 
does away with methodological conversation. They observe the "sur-
vival" of the organism as if they were mechanists or scientists of spe-
cies. The objectivity of the test of survival is a "given," rather than a 
bedded in Weber's methodology, if not the social theory he actually constructed using the 
methodology. 
38. Freud published the first great work of dynamic psychology, Interpretation of Dreams, in 
1900 as Die Traumdeutung. He first used the term "psychoanalysis" (in French!) in 1896. See P. 
GAY, FREUD: A LIFE FOR OUR TIME 103 (1988). Planck's first paper in quantum theory was 
published in 1900. Weber's first methodological essay, "Objectivity in Social Science and Social 
Policy," was published in 1904. See Shils, Foreword to M. WEBER, THE METHODOLOGY OF THE 
SOCIAL SCIENCES at iii (1949). Einstein and Poincare published their papers on special relativity 
in 1905. Jordan and Poulton first explored the biological theory of populations in 1896 and 1903 
respectively. See E. MAYR, supra note 23, at 272. 
For the classic synthetic discussion of the methods of Durkheim, Weber, and Freud, see T. 
PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION (1937). 
39. See infra text accompanying notes 57-58. 
1660 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1647 
reward for methodological conversation.40 
III. BIOLOGICAL AUTOPOIESIS AND ITS PRECURSORS IN SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 
The new description of law and legal institutions, which has been 
brewing at least since the era of Kelsen and Hayek, has the rather 
formidable name, "autopoietic law." Autopoiesis - "self-produc-
tion" - is a term coined by Maturana, a Chilean biologist, to describe 
an advance in the application of systems theory to organisms (pp. 71-
74). The autopoietic paradigm is an important contribution to the sci-
entific modelling of individuation. 
Autopoietic systems are those in which the elements of the system 
generate the network of operations producing the elements of the sys-
tem. 41 By contrast, a system whose elements do not generate their 
network of production in the circular manner of autopoiesis is an allo-
poietic - "other-produced" - system. The elements of an allopoietic 
system are either fixed (given and unchangeable) or generated by 
forces or elements from the system's environment. The system is 
neither independent nor autonomous, since the elements of an allo-
poietic system do not produce themselves exclusively out of elements 
of the system. The core image of an allopoietic system is the machine, 
as opposed to the autopoietic organism. The machine changes when 
its elements change. It cannot resist change in its operations by trans-
forming its elements. Though the elements of an autopoietic system 
almost certainly change as other elements generate them, they change 
40. Hobbes uses at least three tests of validity in his Leviathan. See supra note 17. The 
Leviathan prefigured the test of survival. Nevertheless, Hobbes also retains a teleological test of 
validity, since the Leviathan uses "convenience" as well as survival. Hobbes thus represents a 
transitional figure from naturalism and the biology of species to the modern sciences of the indi· 
vidual and a form ,of autopoietic social theory. Hobbes' positivism, I would argue, is a conse· 
quence of his naturalism, where Hobbes attempts to deal with the absence of a criterion for 
determining the status of the rational observer. His ambivalence is clearest in the claims he 
makes for the laws of nature. At some points he refers to them as rationally observable and 
deducible - his Spinozism. Overall, however, he remits the validity of the laws of nature to a 
third test: self-reflection on the part of the reader. This third test, while not thoroughly worked 
out, resembles the test of health in the modern sciences of the individual. 
Malthus was the first to associate Montesquieu's population science with a test of survival. 
Durkheim uses both a test of survival - in Suicide - and a test of health - in The Division of 
Labor in Society. E. DURKHEIM, SUICIDE (1897); E. DURKHEIM, DIVISION OF LABOR, supra 
note 30. 
Luhmann, correctly I think, distances autopoiesis from the test of survival. P. 14. Neverthe· 
less, his abandonment of the full force of autopoiesis in the positivistic formula, normatively 
closed and cognitively open, restores survival as a possible criterion. 
41. One of the two discoverers of biological autopoiesis, Maturana, defines it as follows: 
We maintain that there are systems that are defined as unities, as networks of productions of 
components that (1) recursively, through their interactions, generate and realize the net· 
work that produces them; and (2) constitute, in the space in which they exist, the boundaries 
of this network as components that participate in the realization of the network. 
Maturana, Autopoiesis, in AUTOPOIESIS, A THEORY OF LIVING ORGANIZATION 21 (M. Zeleny 
ed. 1981). See supra text accompanying note 2. 
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according to operations (criteria) of the system, not in direct response 
to outside pressures (the system is "closed").42 The operations of an 
autopoietic system do not change in response to outside pressures. 
Change in elements is the cost of maintaining the stability of opera-
tions. Hence the autopoietic system maintains its identity as a system 
f •rough its operations, even though its elements need not be the same 
i.1 successive transformations. Even as its elements change in response 
to outside pressures (the system is "open"), the system responds to the 
pressures on its own terms (according to its own operations), not on 
terms established by the environment. It resists such pressures as a 
system by transforming single elements, or by uncoupling an environ-
ment - running away from the pressure. 
The intent of the autopoietic paradigm is to account for the power 
of organisms to control or affect the environments in which they col-
lectively evolve, and to maintain their identity in the face of pressures 
from these environments (or select amongst environments).43 Ordina-
rily allopoietic systems can do neither. Autopoiesis thus focuses on 
attributes of individuation which former scientific methods were hard-
pressed to explain: self-motivation, or the power of individuals to be a 
source of force not motivated externally from the environment, and 
the self-maintenance of individuals in the face of changes in the 
environment. 
Though Luhmann was the first to use autopoiesis explicitly as a 
paradigm for social theory,44 he is by no means the first to use its 
substance to model social processes. Characteristically, the first grand 
autopoietic theory arose in economic, not legal theory, the remarkable 
achievement of Piero Sraffa in his Production of Commodities by 
Means of Commodities. 45 Sraffa had begun work on his masterwork in 
42. Luhmann emphasizes "closure" as the outstanding characteristic of autopoietic systems 
for legal theocy. See p. 15. 
43. Cf N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION supra note 8, at 36-38. 
44. See Luhmann, Autopoiesis, Handlung und Kommunikative Verstiindigung (Autopoiesis, 
Action and Communicative Understanding), 11 ZEITSCHRIFf FUR SOZIOLOGIE 366 (1982). 
Luhmann had been interested in the idea of self-reflexivity for some time. See, e.g., N. 
LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 229 (collecting essays that had been published as 
early as 1971). Chapter 11 (at p. 255) appears to have been written especially for this volume. 
Cf N. LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW 164-65 (1985) (published as the Recht-
ssozio/ogie in 1972) [hereinafter N. LUHMANN, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY]. 
45. See generally P. SRAFFA, PRODUCTION OF COMMODmES BY MEANS OF COMMODmES 
(1960). Once again, a model thought to have originated in the hard sciences had its real debut in 
social theory. The autopoietic lawyers do not seem aware of Sraffa's achievement, and attribute 
the discovery of autopoiesis to biologists. Montesquieu (the theory of populations) and Hegel 
(the biology of individuals) were not to be the last unheralded pathbreakers for the "hard" sci-
ences. Perhaps all hard science models start in cultural orientations, as Thomas Kuhn has sug-
gested. See T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 94-95 (2d ed. enlarged 
1970). A nice case of direct impact of philosophy on science is Ampere's discovery of the mag-
netic effects of electric currents as a consequence of his conviction, learned from Kant, that 
unobservable theoretical entities could be studied through their interactions. See Williams, An-
dre-Marie Ampere, ScI. AM., Jan. 1989, at 90. Lewis Carroll Epstein has emphasized the role of 
good and bad myths in scientific theory. See L. EPSTEIN, RELATIVITY VISUALIZED 76-77 (1981) 
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the late 1920s, at just about the same time that Kelsen produced his, 
the Pure Theory of Law (1934).46 Kelsen's theory, unlike Sraffa's, is 
only partly autopoietic. Kelsen, of course, saw every norm as both 
generated by and generating norms, except the "basic norm" (at the 
top of his hierarchy of norms) and the "individual norm" (at the bot-
tom). Kelsen's legal theory is thus not fully autopoietic, because 
norms form a hierarchy, not a circle. His theory doesn't achieve the 
generative circularity that is characteristic of autopoietic systems, but 
uses the "basic norm" instead as a generative seed for the dynamic 
norm-production of the system. Kelsen's theory thus bears a striking 
resemblance to the economic theory of Ricardo, which uses com as a 
"basic commodity" by which all value can be measured in the repro-
duction of the means of production.47 Sraffa trumps Ricardo by using 
a fully autopoietic measure - a constructed "standard commodity" 
defining the conditions of reproduction in terms of equations of pro-
duction rather than in terms of any single basic commodity such as 
com, or even Marx's ···socially necessary labor time." 
Hayek's work in the mid-1970s probably constitutes the first fully 
autopoietic legal theory.48 Hayek, however, self-consciously eschews 
any scientific model, except perhaps the economic methodology of 
Mises.49 Hayek's is also not a theory of sheer observation, as 
Luhmann's confinement of autopoietic law within a social subsystem 
may be, 50 but rather serves to ground a normative jurisprudence. In 
this sense, Hayek has already outstripped the autopoieticists in recon-
ciling the conflict between normative work and social science that af-
flicts all forms of positivism, legal and scientific. 
IV. AUTOPOIETIC LAW AND SOCIETY 
Though Luhmann is primarily interested in sociological theories of 
law, he applies the autopoietic paradigm most convincingly not to law 
but to the social system. Luhmann's first (and most clearly defensible) 
assertion is that social systems are autopoietic. His second assertion, 
which he correctly believes to be more problematic, is that under cer-
tain conditions the legal system, as a subsystem of the social system, 
(relativity is a natural geometric theory, which can be easily visualized once we have fashioned a 
good myth for it). 
46. H. KELSEN, supra note 4. 
47. See M. BLAUG, EcoNOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 93-103 (rev. ed. 1968). 
48. See 1 F. VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 93-103 (1973) [hereinafter F. 
VON HAYEK, VOL. l]. Jean-Pierre Dupuy appreciates Luhmann's link to Hayek. Pp. 64-68. 
49. See generally L. VON MISES, EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS (1976) (pub-
lished as Grundprobleme der Nationa/iikonomie in 1933). 
50. At the outset Luhmann denies the origin of the autopoietic paradigm in the conscious-
ness of an observer. See pp. 12-18. Luhmann is troubled, nonetheless, by the need of self-refer-
ential systems (including the system of the observer!) to have an account of reality. See p. 338; 
see also pp. 262-65. 
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can be at least partly autopoietic in the manner of the general social 
system. Hence autopoietic law involves a claim about law and a claim 
about society. 
A. Law and Society 
Almost every statement about autopoietic law can be and is con-
tested in the marvelous essays of Teubner's collection.51 Autopoiesis 
is, after all, a young science, and even its most enthusiastic propo-
nents, such as Luhmann and Teubner, concede that the utility of auto-
poiesis for legal theory is uncertain (pp. 23, 221-24). Nevertheless, 
autopoietic law lays down some broad vistas. Viewing them refreshes 
the soul of even the most theory-weary reader. · 
The basic idea of autopoletic law· is that in certain circumstances, 
which Luhmann and his co-workers have begun to elaborate, law (and 
only law) defines what.is and what is not law, and every law must 
participate in defining what is and is not law. By itself, the. idea that 
law defines law and that every law must take part in the defining (a 
mathematician would say that law is a recursive function52) is not a 
novel theoretical proposition. Fran~ois Ewald traces the roots of the 
idea to Kelsen's "law of law" (pp. 36-50). Teubner (p. 224) and 
Luhmann (p. 22) recall H.L.A. Hart's formulation of the proposition 
that in complex societies law serves the secondary ftinction of recog-
nizing norms that serve the primary function of directing or facilitat-
ing behavior.53 The real novelty of autopoietic law is that it tracks 
down exactly what it means for law to define law, and promises to 
show the exact social, legal, and cultural (but not political!54) condi-
tions in which law defining law is possible. In other words, autopoietic 
law embeds H.L.A. Hart's "rule of recognition" or Kelsen's "basic 
norm," which like all positivist proceduralisms fall from the heavens, 
in a social practice. 
The social practice in which Luhmann embeds the legal recursive-
ness of complex societies is a vision of society as communication. 55 
Sl. Especially in the essays of proponents. Compare Luhmann's contributions (pp. 14-33, 
34S-48) with Teubner's (pp. 217-37), and Deggau's contribution (pp. 128-Sl) with Nelken's (pp. 
191-21S). 
S2. See supra note 33. 
S3. H.L.A. HART, THE CoNCEPT OF LAW (1961) ("rules of recognition"). Hart's theory is 
even less autopoietic than Kelsen's, since he divides all norms into two great categories, those 
that generate other norms and those that are generated by other norms. 
S4. Thomas Heller's piece, Accounting for Law, is the only one in the volume to discuss the 
politics of autopoiesis directly. Pp. 283-311. I guess the others really believe that the legal sys-
tem is autonomous, or that God does not play politics in evolution. 
SS. Luhmann models the legal system as a subsystem of society, where society is itself an 
autopoietic system whose elements are communications: 
The social system consists of meaningful communications - only of communications, and 
of all communications. It forms its elementary units from the synthesis of information, 
communication, comprehension, i.e., from the synthesis of three selections, which can be 
partially (but only partially) controlled by the system. As such element formation always 
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Luhmann's account of society as communication is quite striking, and 
is, by itself, worth the price of admission to Autopoietic Law. 56 
His notion has its roots in Habermas' paradigm of communicative 
action. 57 Habermas uses "communicative action" to criticize what he 
considers to be Talcott Parsons' exclusive focus on social relations as 
functionally coordinated "systems."58 Communicative action is a reg-
ulative ideal immanent within empirical social interaction. It is the 
setting in which members of a community coordinate action to pursue 
common conceptions of meaning. As such, Habermas prefers commu-
nicative action to system, though system is necessary to "pay the rent" 
and must be modelled by the social scientist. 
Luhmann's notion of communication lacks the critical bite of 
Habermas' conception. Society, for Luhmann, is communication - a 
ceaseless expression of information by one and comprehension by an-
other. Luhmann does not oppose communication to system -
Habermas' anti-utopia. Rather Luhmann opposes communication to 
action itself, which Luhmann regards as the choice of addressees for 
communication (action means not communicating to those who are 
not chosen). Action is thus a "powerfully simplifying self-observation 
or self-description of the system by itself,"59 which keeps communica-
tion, hence society, going. Consequently, no one ideal model of com-
municative action, such as Habermas' ideal speech situation, deserves 
pride of place in the signalling interchanges that both motivate func-
tional systems and are facilitated by them. Communication is textured 
presupposes society and always continues society, there is no communication outside society 
and therefore no communication of society with its environment. No man can communicate 
(in the sense of achieving communication) without thereby constituting society, but the so-
cial system itself (precisely for this reason!) is not capable of communication: it can find no 
addressees outside itself to which it could communicate anything. 
P. 18. See also N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 73. 
56. Pp. 16-23. Luhmann writes very fast. He also presents a moving target. His writing is a 
way of thinking, a real dialogue with the republic of letters. One might almost say that 
Luhmann's oeuvre itself is autopoietic: it unceasingly regenerates itself, maintaining its identity 
by changing its elements. Thus almost anything one says about Luhmann's thought is bound to 
be wrong, since he, like quantum reality, leaves a position as soon as one observes him taking it. 
In other words, he is a great theorist. 
57. See I ]. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION; REASON AND THE 
RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 273-337 (1984) (published as Theorie des Kommunikativen 
Hande/ns, Band I. Handlungsrationalitiit und gese/lschaft/iche Rationalisierung in 1981). 
58. 2 J, HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF CoMMUNICATIVE ACTION; LIFEWORLD AND SYS-
TEM: A CRmQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 199-299 (1987). 
59. P. 16. As an American, I hate the idea of a system "observing itself." I have the bias of 
the common lawyer, that people do things, not systems. Nevertheless, Luhmann's sentence 
makes sense. A system "describes itself" by specifying the exact "routes of communication" 
describing the system. The system does not describe itself in a blueprint of routes, but through 
actions that make and remake the routes during the life of the system. Hence, the system de-
scribes itself through actions. It is also possible to understand the idea that systems, as opposed 
to individuals, have actions. The bank teller is everyone's favorite example: customer and teller 
interact according to patterns dictated by a system. One can't even say that the "creator" of the 
system dictated the patterns, since she too is fulfilling the prerequisites of a system, and so forth. 
From the point of view of individuals, system actions are "roles." 
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and various. It need not even include speech, certainly not rational 
discourse, so long as it expresses information calculated to change the 
understanding (in some way) of an addressee of the communication. 
The exact meaning of "law defines law" becomes crystal clear as 
soon as one formulates the proposition in terms of communication. 
One cannot make "political" or "moral" statements to a person who 
expects "legal" ones. A "political" or "moral" statement simply will 
not register. The statement can certainly have moral or political con-
tent - no autopoieticist would deny that most or all legal statements 
do - but it must be in "legal form" in order for the addressee of the 
statement, behaving as if she is in a legal setting, to receive it and do 
something about it. After all, the addressee is on the hook. She re-
quires a legal statement, because she must in tum make a responsive 
legal statement either back to the maker of the original statement or to 
a third party. (Think of a purchaser of real property, who needs a 
deed in order to give a deed to some future purchaser.) When asked 
for "reasons," she must be able to refer back to an original statement, 
lest her subsequent statement be rejected by the third party, and so 
forth. 
Autopoietic law is thus more radical than the formulation of either 
Kelsen or Hart because it insists that every "legal communication" 
must respond to a prior legal communication, and every legal commu-
nication must command a subsequent legal communication. It is also 
more radical, because it eliminates two very compelling and destruc-
tive notions that plague the dominant legal theories. These are the 
notions of "center" (which we traditionally associate with positivism), 
and "hierarchy" (which we associate with naturalism). 
Luhmann's vision of society lacks the usual topology of social, 
political, and legal thinking. Hobbes, for example, starts with the im-
age of a level social universe, the state of nature, only to show how it is 
possible to construct a sovereign out of it. The sovereign is a center, 
around which the whole of society revolves. Kelsen (less so Hart) 
imagines a "hierarchy" of norms (their naturalist softening of positiv-
ism). Our image of order is indelibly impressed with images of hierar-
chy and center. We find it difficult to imagine society-without them. 60 
Yet doing without these images is exactly what Luhmann strives to 
accomplish. His social science takes no position on center or hierar-
chy (see, e.g., pp. 21-22). "Center" is an image, a way we have of 
talking with each other. "Hierarchy" is another way of talking. We 
may, of course, behave in accordance with the way of talking, but not 
because "center" or "hierarchy" are givens. It is even possible that we 
talk "center" or "hierarchy,_" while behaving in quite another 
60. See N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 287, 353-55 (center), 359 
(hierarchy). 
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manner.61 
Law in Luhmann's vision is just "law talk," legal communication. 
We do not make legal statements to one another because we are obey-
ing the orders of a central sovereign or are reflecting a natural or con-
structed legal hierarchy. We make legal statements because we wish 
to have an impact on the understanding of persons who expect us to be 
making legal statements. Our legal statements form an autopoietic 
system, in that every legal statement serves to generate the network of 
operations constituting further legal statements. 
B. Legal Theory 
The attraction of autopoiesis for legal theorists flows exactly from 
its ability to account for two characteristics of individuality: self-moti-
vation (the dynamism of legal systems) and self-maintenance (the 
resistance of legal systems to outside forces). Legal systems give rise 
to legal norms in ways that cannot be mechanically traced to forces 
from the environment, such as politics or religion. Even if a society is 
utterly stable (even if its legal system fully reflects all possible social 
forces), certain legal systems still appear to have the dynamic capacity 
to transform society, or to resist transformation. Social science must 
be able to describe these systems, and the autopoietic lawyers claim to 
have discovered a means to do so. Under certain conditions, which 
the autopoietic lawyers could in principle describe, a legal system can 
be a source of force in the society. It need not be only the passive 
instrument of outside powers. 
Positivism and naturalism, premised as they are on scientific mod-
els giving no active role to individuals either as observers or as subjects 
of observation, cannot successfully model either component of individ-
uality. With regard to self-motivation, positivism at most promises 
the independence of the legal system from outside forces, once the 
power controlling the legal system has used the procedure it offers to 
set the mark of legality on certain compelling orders. Positivism 
reduces self-motivation to autonomy. Yet the autonomy of the posi-
tivist system is passive, a freedom from outside forces. Positivist au-
tonomy is not active autonomy, not a freedom to be a source of force 
independently contributing to the array of forces in society. Positive 
legal systems cannot generate law out of law, from within the system, 
as an autopoietic system generates elements from elements within the 
system (pp. 36-50). Positive law is always the result, the instrument, 
of outside powers - religion or politics or custom. 62 The legal system 
61. I am reminded of the famous response of the governors of the Spanish colonial empire to 
orders from the king: "I obey, but I do not comply." 
62. And, of course, the outside powers have nothing in them of law. Thus politics does not 
have its laws. It is naked force flowing from unabashedly interested agreements (as if agreement 
did not require law!). Nor does religion have laws. Religion is the fantasy life, the Sunday 
hobby, of otherwise law-abiding citizens. 
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is open to and at the mercy of its environments. Positivism (at least 
positivism before Kelsen) always supposes that legal systems make law 
as mechanisms make things: only in response to inputs from outside 
the system. Like any mechanism, the legal system is a dead instru-
ment, ready to be wielded by whatever power in society gains control 
over it. 
The only validity the positivists can claim for law is that it does not 
betray or corrupt the wishes of the wielder of the instrument. But a 
positive system cannot even achieve this limited autonomy, since the 
wielder of the instrument can always corrupt it to suit detailed expres-
sions of power in individual cases. Even minor powers, not "wielders 
of the instrument," can capture it quietly in single cases, unbeknownst 
to the wielding power. Law as "orders" cannot even achieve order, 
unless a nonlegal force, such as "habit" in Austin, has already pro-
duced it. 
The problem in naturalism is the excessive, counter-factual affinity 
of natural systems for stasis. Natural law is the perception of an es-
sence. By contrast to positivism, the world of naturalism is legal stuff 
- whether divine laws, human laws, or laws of nature. But laws only 
express the stuff; they cannot change it. Nor would the natural lawyer 
want to try. The naturalist judge is always stamping out departures 
from the expressed essence. The legal system serves to facilitate the 
impression of the essence on a world always threatening to dissolve 
into chaos. 
Autopoiesis, by contrast, defines a system that generates itself inde-
pendently from its environment. Autopoietic systems can, in princi-
ple, be autonomous, or resistant to outside powers. Applied to law, 
autopoiesis asserts that under certain conditions laws do indeed gener-
ate themselves.from laws, not from religion or politics or custom.63 
We must, of course, inquire - and will inquire - from what point 
of view the autonomy of the legal system may be a value. The auto-
poieticists claim that they do not maintain autonomy as a value, and 
they are correct that the autonomy of legal systems under certain con-
ditions is an empirical fact, which autopoiesis successfully models. 64 
Where positivism suggests a legal system insufficiently protected 
from outside pressure - too frangible, too porous - naturalism re-
quires the legal system to remain true to an essence refined and ex-
63. Exactly which laws generate themselves in this manner, whether general legal norms or 
specific applications of norms to single cases, is a critical problem for autopoietic law, especially 
as an account of the common law. See infra text accompanying notes 114-18; cf pp. 180-81 
(norms can withstand individual, but not aggregate, deviation). 
64. Lempert's detailed and illuminating comparison of the absolute autonomy sought by 
Continental theorists with the relative autonomy sought by empiricist common law scholars is 
important, and will support a central theme of this Book Review concerning the inapplicability 
ofautopoiesis as it presently stands to common law systems. See pp. 152-90 (especially 178-82). 
Nevertheless, Lempert agrees that autopoietic law puts its finger on something. See pp. 172-73. 
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pressed in a single, unchanging set of norms. The only change 
naturalism recognizes is corruption of or progress toward the essence 
- either chaos or reconstruction. Whereas positive systems have no 
internal life (they lie there like clubs to be wielded by anyone powerful 
or clever enough to capture or use them), natural systems recognize no 
life outside themselves. Everything different is diseased, not alive in 
another way. The essence that laws reflect is an essence precisely be-
cause it is eternal (and unchanging, though some naturalists play with 
the difference). Positivism treats legal change as legitimate - a fresh 
irruption of power. Naturalism cannot treat change as legitimate, for 
change always spells the death of the legal system. Autopoietic sys-
tems, by contrast, require change. They do not just tolerate it as do 
positive systems. 
V. LUHMANN'S RETREAT FROM AUTOPOIESIS 
Luhmann's vision of law as a special sort of communication ulti-
mately depends on defining the circumstances in which law talk, as 
opposed to other ways of talking, is the expected communication. So 
far in his work on autopoietic law Luhmann has used the model of law 
he developed in his pre-autopoietic work, A Sociological Theory of Law 
(1972).65 Though Luhmann believes that the two can be made consis-
tent, 66 I fear that the old work, which is at once positivist and natural-
ist in its orientation, detracts from the nonpositivist and non-naturalist 
potential of the autopoietic model. Luhmann's old work de-centers 
the individual in the legal system by functionally confining the legal 
system within a subsystem of the social system. Luhmann finds func-
tional confinement of the legal system useful for elucidating the empir-
ical conditions under which the unity and autonomy of legal systems 
are possible. But his emphasis on unity and autonomy may represent 
a retreat from autopoiesis. 
A. Luhmann~ Pre-Autopoietic Legal Theory 
Luhmann's old work takes the Hobbesian perspective that law is 
an instrument for the production of order. Like Hobbes, Luhmann 
attempts a project that is at once positivist and naturalist. Hence, 
Luhmann does not begin his work with the (now) usual positivist as-
sumption that a procedure has fallen from the heavens. Like Hobbes, 
Luhmann attempts to account for the natural growth of the procedure 
from a legal state of nature. 
Although Luhmann's account has a more modern style than Hob-
bes', it has the same basic structure.67 Hobbes starts from a legal state 
65. N. LUHMANN, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 44. 
66. See Preface to N. LUHMANN, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at xii. 
67. One little-known fact about Hobbes' legal state of nature is that it is thoroughly legal It 
is not a condition of no-law, as many suppose, but a condition thoroughly imbued with legal 
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of nature without either a social system or a civilized individual. He 
then deduces the social structure and the civilized individual from his 
laws of nature (Hobbes' naturalism). The positivist proceduralism and 
the civilized subject of the proceduralism are the deductive and empir-
ical result of the laws of nature (Hobbes' Spinozism). Luhmann es-
chews laws of nature, of course. 68 Instead, he begins with the civilized 
individual. 69 
The civilized individual at the beginning of A Sociological Theory 
of Law seeks, as Hobbes' creature, to maximize its convenience by re-
ducing the complexity of and contingency in its environment. 70 The 
most powerful engine for accomplishing these reductions, as in Hob-
bes, is the cooperation of other individuals. 71 These others also wish 
to maximize their convenience by reducing complexity and contin-
gency, hence there is a "double contingency" in every effort at cooper-
ation. 72 Individuals have "expectations" as a result of reducing 
complexity and contingency. Because they do so by cooperating with 
other individuals, they have expectations of the others' expectations. 73 
These "expectations of expectations," which are fundamental to 
Luhmann's legal theory, pose special problems of coordination. The 
key problem is whether individuals are prepared to revise their 
exptectations when another individual disappoints them - a cognitive 
response - or whether they are not prepared to revise their expecta-
tions - a normative response. 74 The choice between cognitive and 
premises. Hobbes is very clear that the state of nature is characterized by the legal condition in 
which every man has a right to everything. Most latter-day Hobbesians suppose that the state of 
nature is one in which no man has a right to anything. This is not Hobbes. But it is Hegel, for 
example, and it is Luhmann. The project in the Leviathan is to show how a restriction of the 
natural condition of plenitude of right is possible. The instrument of the restriction is contract. 
Hence Hobbes' legal theory is a theory of contracL The project for those, such as Luhmann, who 
see the state of nature as being devoid of legal matter - as a condition of no-right, to use 
Hohfeld's terminology - is to show how rights may evolve from nothing, typically through the 
property idea of building up expectations. Hence Luhmann's legal theory, like Hegel's, depends 
on property rather than contract. 
This is not the place to explore the consequences of these positions, but they are obviously 
quite rich and interesting. See, e.g., Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Effi-
cient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 711 (1980). Even though Luhmann differs from Hobbes in this 
respect, the structure of his enterprise, like Hegel's, is virtually identical. The only real difference 
is that neither Hegel nor Luhmann, unlike Hobbes, believes in the notion of the legal state of 
nature. They envision a state of nature devoid o~justification; not rich with it as Hobbes envi-
sioned. The development of law is then a progressive enchantment of nature through 
justification. 
68. See N. LUHMANN, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 10. 
69. See id. at 23-24. 
70. See id. at 24-26. 
71. See id. at 26-27. 
72. See id. at 26. 
73. See id. 
74. See id. at 31-34. So, for example, if I lose a bet on a boxer whom I expect to win, I will 
revise my expectations of his skill if he loses fair-and-square. My reaction is "cognitive." If, 
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normative is not graven in stone. 75 It is selectively influenced by the 
development of ever more successful methods of coordination driven 
by the persistent desire of individuals to reduce complexity and contin-
gency. A crucial step along the path of realizing this desire is the insti-
tutionalization of expectations, in which "expectations are based on 
the presupposed expectations of expectation on the part of a third 
party."76 Institutionalization allows the formation of generalized ex-
pectations over an entire social system, thus stabilizing the expecta-
tions of expectations over many parties. 77 Law is the institution of one 
method of generalization. 
Social systems evolve more effective ways of handling the coordi-
nation problem, the natural history of which Luhmann explores in 
considerable depth. 78 The mechanisms of natural selection of methods 
of coordination are the familiar ones that social theory borrowed from 
Darwin through Durkheim. 79 The basic technique of selection is the 
differentiation of functionally specific subsystems of coordination. 80 
The function of law, according to Luhmann, is to offer individuals a 
method of coordination that coordinates all other methods of coordi-
nation. 81 Laws are thus "congruently generalized normative 
behavioural expectations. " 82 
At the heart of Luhmann's legal theory, therefore, is the notion 
however, he threw the fight, I will not revise my expectations of his skill, but will be "norma-
tively" outraged at losing my bet. 
75. See id. at 36-40. 
76. See id. at 49. 
77. See id. at 64-69. Luhmann's notion of "expectations of expectations" reflects his general 
concern with the self-reflexivity of social phenomena, which he pursued in depth after the publi-
cation of A Sociological Theory of Law in 1972. See, e.g., N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, 
supra note 8, at 324-62. 
Luhmann's insight into the self-reflexivity of social phenomena, including legal phenomena, 
is beginning to be reflected in recent American legal scholarship. See, e.g., Sterk, The Continuity 
of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts Clause, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 658, 661-65, 699 
(1988) (analyzing legislature's expectations about their own expectations and the expectation of 
contract parties); Sterk, Foresight and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 956 (1988) 
(analyzing expectations of owners who enter into servitudes of their own future expectations and 
the expectations of future owners). The reflection is all the more remarkable since Luhmann's 
work is relatively unknown here. 
Douglas Hofstadter's extraordinary introduction to the effects of Kurt Godel's logic of reflec-
tion on the sciences and humanities actually suggests the applicability of the logic of reflection to 
legal subjects. See D. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, EsCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 
692-93 (1980). The major advances in chaos theory revolving around self-reflection gained gen-
eral exposure only in 1976. See ]. GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 183 (1987) 
(Feigenbaum's lectures on the universality of certain recursive scalings). See also B. MANDEL· 
BROT, FRACTALS: FORM, CHANCE, AND DIMENSION (1977) (linking recursive effects·in several 
scientific subjects). 
Once again, a social theorist has tied the hard scientists, if not beaten them to the punch! 
78. See N. LUHMANN, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 103-226. 
79. See id. at 103-14; cf. E. DURKHEIM, DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 30. 
80. See N. LUHMANN, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 44, at 167-74. 
81. See id. at 73-83. 
82. See id. at 77. 
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that the legal system is a functionally defined subsystem of the social 
system: the subsystem specializing in coordinating all other methods 
of coordination. Luhmann's functional definition is characteristically 
positivist and naturalist for at least three reasons. 83 
First, Luhmann's law is a selection-device for generalizing norma-
tive expectations. It takes no position on the substance of norms. All 
that matters is that law can serve the overriding function of stabilizing 
expectations through generality. The mark of law is a procedure, 
whereby methods of generalizing norms are coordinated. But this is 
the method of positivism - marking law without attention to content. 
The naturalist point of Luhmann's functionalism is that law does not 
by itself determine the materials for generalization. These are pro-
vided to law by the evolution and play of societal processes. Law can-
not teach; it can only ·express what is already given. 84 · 
Second, Luhmanil defines "norm," the material law seeks to gener-
alize, as a reaction to disappointment: refusal to adjust one's expecta-
tions as a consequence of disappointment. The hinge of the definition 
is reaction to disappointment. Luhmann excludes aspiration from the 
definition. The norm states a reaction to disappointment of expecta-
tions one has about the behavior of another. It does not express expec-
tations one has about one's own behavior. The norm is other-
regarding, even if it is reciprocal. The occupant of Luhmann's legal 
system, like the occupant of any positivist system, always regards 
norms as an outsider regards norms - describing the behavior of 
others. The norm is an instrument of stabilizing expectations about 
others. It is never the occupant's instrument for relating herself to 
others. The individual as such is absent from the legal system. Others 
appear in the degraded condition of satisfying or disappointing expec-
tations. They can never be individuals as such, collaborators in aspira-
tion. "Cross at the green, not in between" is the same to Luhmann as 
"Be a faithful trustee." We may have different reactions to dishonest 
trustees than to jaywalkers. Yet both commands are norms, because 
both take a stance toward disappointment of the expectations set up in 
them. · 
Third, Luhmann distinguishes cognitive (prepared to learn) from 
normative (not prepared to learn) reactions to disappointment. The 
distinction between cognitive and normative - the "is" and the 
83. At the time he published A Sociologzi:al Theory of Law in 1972, Luhmann was not at all 
shy about his positivist orientation. See, e.g., id. at 159-66. He would have been far less comfort-
able with the thought that his positivism, like all positivism, has a necessary naturalist compo-
nent. Luhmann's positivism bears careful review, however, since autopoietic law is frankly 
nonpositivist, and the difficulty for Luhmann is in reconciling his old positivist results with his 
new nonpositivist inclinations. 
84. For example, Luhmann comments on the validity of legislation: "Such passing of law 
can only occur to the extent that the selectivity itself is used for the stabilisation oflaw. Positive 
law is not valid because higher norms permit it, but because its selectivity fulfills the function of 
congruency." Id. at 156 (emphasis in the original). 
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"ought" is the fundamental distinction of positivism. The 
proceduralism of legal positivism is a way of fixing a boundary be-
tween the two. We choose what we choose to disregard. The distinc-
tion favors cognition over normation: one can disregard only what 
one has already regarded. 85 Hence positivism, both legal and scien-
tific, always asserts the primacy of cognition. Luhmann's legal theory, 
like all forms of positivism, favors cognition over normation. 86 The 
utility minded creatures of Luhmann's theory are prepared not to 
learn in order to stabilize expectations, to increase the possibility and 
efficacy of cognition. As in positivist science, the role of law in positiv-
ist legal theory and in Luhmann's is to enlarge the realm of effective 
cognition for utilitarian ends. 
B. Luhmann's Use of the Pre-Autopoietic Theory for Autopoiesis 
Luhmann's vision of the legal system in his old work hinges on the 
distinction between normative and cognitive reactions to disappoint-
ment of expectations. Law serves as a master device for congruently 
generalizing normative expectations. Luhmann preserves this distinc-
tion in autopoietic law, because he wishes to assign a functionally de-
fined role to the legal system as a subsystem of the social system. As 
Luhmann noticed, his old legal theory works well for the program of 
functionally confining the legal system, hence preserving its autonomy 
from the rest of society (pp. 18-19, 26-28). 
The formula Luhmann develops is that the legal system is auto-
poietic for norms, defined in opposition to cognition. The legal system 
is normatively closed and cognitively open (pp. 19-23). Only norms 
recursively reproduce themselves in the manner of autopoiesis. Cogni-
tion - the application of norms to real disputes and the formation of 
norms in response to real political, moral, and economic issues - is 
not legally recursive (pp. 26-31) (though every communication must, 
of course, play a role in the autopoiesis of the entire social system (pp. 
339-40)). The legal system maintains its normative integrity from 
Luhmann's perspective. When individuals use the legal system to re-
solve disputes, or legal functionaries give content to norms either by 
"finding" congruently generalized normative expectations or by hy-
pothesizing them in legislation, then nonlegal forces affect the legal 
system. It is cognitively open (p. 31). 
The role of cognition in Luhmann's pre-autopoietic legal theory is 
to serve the ends of civilized, utility-minded creatures who wish to 
maximize their convenience by cooperatively stabilizing expectations. 
Luhmann's autopoietic legal theory preserves the functional role of 
85. The naturalist point here is that what we regard, unlike what we choose not to regard, is 
not open to choice. 
86. And, like all forms of positivism, has a naturalist account of cognition. 
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cognition, but adds a new role for the legal system that is special to 
autopoiesis: its dynamism (albeit debased, from my point of view). 
Cognitive openness introduces asymmetries into the legal system. 
New cases present new problems of norm-application, hence norm-
formation. New social conditions require different responses to old 
cases. Without new cases and new social conditions the autopoietic 
system would exist "as pure tautology in total indeterminability" (p. 
22). A legal system in which every new case is an old case and for 
which social conditions are absolutely stable would not be autopoietic. 
An autopoietic system reproduces its operations through its elements, 
not its elements through its operations. The legal system, like any 
autopoietic system, cannot be unless it is in motion (pp. 341-42). The 
cognitive openness of the legal system, according to Luhmann, drives 
it into the constant adjustments that make it dynamic, hence auto-
poietic. But the dynamism does not come from within the system. 
The self-motivation of the system serves the self-maintenance of the 
system, its autonomy. Internal reflection on norms serves only the 
purpose of consistency, or unity. 87 Real critique that changes norms 
for reasons other than internal consistency is external critique which 
the system internalizes on its own terms. 
C. Retreat 
The distinction between cognitive and normative and the func-
tional confinement of the legal system within a subsystem of the social 
system detract from the force of the autopoietic paradigm for law for 
three reasons. 
First, autopoiesis is a strong model of individuality, maybe too 
strong to be usefully applied to social systems. Before social science 
began modelling individuality in the era of Freud and Weber, the indi-
vidual organism was available only as a metaphor for society. 88 Theo-
rists regarded the reality of society, following scientific models then 
available to them, to be either a mechanical aggregate (the school of 
political economy) or a species being (Hegel, Marx). The individual 
organism makes a demanding model. (Durkheim, for example, is least 
convincing when he describes society as an organism in The Division of 
Labor in Society. 89) The model may, for example, require a political 
program of either corporatism or institutionalism. It certainly sug-
gests some version of the two ways scientists learn about organisms: 
structure (anatomy) and function (physiology). 
The danger of the model is that it may lead theorists to identify 
structure with institutions (institutionalism) and function with the sur-
87. Seep. 346; N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 238. 
88. Hobbes describes tbe "Leviathan" either as an "artificial creature" (mechanism) or as a 
metaphor. See T. HOBBES, supra note 17. 
89. See E. DURKHEIM, DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 40,.at 260. 
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vival of the institutions (corporatism). Social theorists must always be 
vigilant to use structure and function (if they use them at all) in a 
more "value-neutral" sense. Thus Mark Gould has defined "struc-
ture" as "patterns of social interaction, where violation of the pattern 
implies (in the ideal case) a negative sanction," and "function" as 
"consequences of [units'] actions for the system as a whole."90 These 
"value-neutral" definitions of structure and function do not assume 
that "society" is striving to preserve structures through functional so-
lutions of structural "problems." Luhmann has consistently strived to 
use definitions of structure and function that avoid the teleology of the 
classic functionalism of Durkheim.91 
As a most demanding model of the organism, autopoiesis may not 
be consistent with a nonteleological functionalism.92 The very point of 
autopoiesis is to model the self-maintenance and self-motivation of in-
dividual organisms. Autopoiesis thus takes a position on the "conse-
quences of [units'] actions for the system as a whole." Autopoietic 
functions must strive to preserve structures, and autopoietic structures 
change in purposive directions. This is all well and good for the real 
biological individuals autopoiesis was originally meant to describe, but 
runs dead against the "value-neutral" definitions of structure and 
function which Luhmann still has a commitment to use. To accept 
autopoiesis as a model for social systems may involve adopting a cor-
poratist or institutionalist politics and a teleological functionalism 
which Luhmann, for one, may not welcome. 
Luhmann could, of course, maintain his commitment to "value-
neutral" definitions of structure and function were he to confine auto-
poiesis to the individual actor in the social system. There is no theo-
retical reason why the autopoiesis of the individual could not be 
broadened to include speech and actions that sociologists ordinarily 
classify as social action. Indeed, Hayek's version of autopoietic law 
does exactly this.93 So long as one maintains the nonindividualist sta-
tus of values, as Hayek does, the realm of the social can be preserved. 
Values are then part of the material substrate on which individuals 
autopoietically maintain themselves. But Luhmann does not wish to 
locate society in an account of values, which he believes require a level 
of cohesion that pluralist and conflict-ridden advanced industrial de-
90. M. GOULD, REVOLUTION IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM: THE COMING OP 
THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 3 (1987). 
91. See, e.g .• N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 241-42. 
92. Nor, for that matter, may Luhmann's pre-autopoietic version of autopoiesis, his notion of 
"self-reflexivity," be consistent with a nonteleological functionalism. See, e.g., the highly teleo-
logical language in N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 236. Luhmann treads on 
especially dangerous ground when he applies "self-reflexivity" to function. See id. at 238-39. 
93. See 1 F. VON HAYEK, supra note 48, at 46,048; 3 F. VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION 
AND LIBERTY 158-59 (1979). 
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mocracies will not support.94 Instead, he prefers to locate society in 
communication, ways of talking about values among other issues.95 A 
social theory anchored in values can tolerate, or even welcome, the 
individual as a counterweight to values - the specification or working 
out of values in interaction. Norms - including legal norms - play 
the role in these theories of mediating between values, on the one 
hand, and individuals oriented toward values in concrete interactions, 
on the other.96 Luhmann's theory of society as communication toler-
ates neither values nor individuals. Values for him are what the indi-
vidual desires, rather than what is desirable. 91 Individuals are the 
desiring creatures of Hobbes' utilitarian calculus, rather than moral 
beings wrestling values into action through norms.9s 
Communication replaces both values and the moral beings ori-
ented toward values through norms. The self-reflexivity of communi-
cation, communication about communication, replaces norms as the 
chief integrating mechanism of society.99 Given Luhmann's goal of 
subordinating both values and individuals in social theory, confining 
autopoiesis to the biological individual would destroy the social theory 
of autopoiesis, as Luhmann understands it. 100 The common law re-
quires reference to both, we shall see, values and individuals. It is, 
dynamic, rather than autonomous. Hence, Luhmann's social theory is 
not likely to be ad~quate to describe it. 
Second, assuming the propriety of the autopoietic model for soci-
ety, it is difficult to imagine an autopoietic subsystem of an autopoietic 
system.101 The functional definition of subsystems has its roots in 
Durkheim's conceptualization of the "division of labor" as a second 
device for social integration besides the "mechanical solidarity" of 
94. See N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 73-74. 
95. ''[S]ociety is the comprehensive system of all reciprocally accessible communicative ac-
tions." N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 73 (emphasis in original). 
96. See M. GOULD, supra note 90, at 5-8. 
97. See N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 97, 250-51. I am grateful to 
Mark Gould for pointing out to me the difference between "desired" and "desirable." 
98. See Luhmann's criticism of Durkheim's emphasis on the moral problem of sociology in 
id. at 7-10. Luhmann is quite clear that the role of the person in autopoietic law is to serve 
"merely [as] a point of allocation and address." P. 339. This is the classic positivist notion of the 
person - a legal accounting device for reconciling the double entry accounts of action and sanc-
tion. The autopoiesis of the social system (hence legal system) must serve higher levels of com-
plexity reduction than the person, who, admittedly, has her own subordinate level of autopoiesis 
in "consciousness." See p. 339. 
99. See N. LUHMANN, DIFFERENTIATION, supra note 8, at 100-02, 349-50. 
100. Hayek's is the model of an autopoietic theory that puts values and individuals, mediated 
by norms, at the center of social theory. 
101. Teubner has especially focused on this problem. See pp. 217-41. I shall not try to 
wrestle here with Teubner's fascinating use of the "hypercycle," and his thesis that legal auto-
poiesis suggests the internalization of the evolutionary mechanisms of law. They are worth de-
tailed study. See also pp. 361-67. 
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common language (perceptions) and values. 102 The social groups that 
form around performance of a common function are bound together 
both by performance of the function and by a "second" tier mechani-
cal solidarity, or common language and values oriented toward per-
formance of the function, called occupational solidarity. 103 Neither 
performance of the function nor occupational solidarity by itself yields 
an autopoiesis of the functionally bound subgroup (just as a social sys-
tem with only mechanical solidarity cannot be autopoietic). The func-
tionally bound subgroup has an autopoiesis only if it constitutes a 
social system within the general society, much as the cell forms an 
organism within the larger organism made up of cells. But the auto-
poiesis of the subgroup could not operate solely over the functional 
thematization of the subgroup within the larger society. A "legal sub-
system" has an economy, a power structure, etc., but these in-
terchange mechanisms of the "legal subsystem" would thematize 
·power and money in their communications, not law. The acid test of 
the subsystem will always be whether it is successfully meeting the 
functional demands of the social system. The subsystem earns money, 
gets power, by meeting functional demands. Even a highly differenti-
ated legal subsystem cannot obviously maintain the absolute control 
over production and reproduction of the legal code that autopoiesis 
requires. 104 Even if a subsystem could, the autopoiesis of legal com-
munications must also constitute an autopoiesis of the general social 
system of communications if the social system is to maintain its own 
operative unity and autonomy. Communications can serve two mas-
ters - "payment" can have both an economic and a legal significance 
(pp. 342-43) - but can be loyal to only one of them. 
Luhmann is aware of the difficulty of imagining an autopoiesis of 
function-specific communications in the context of an autopoietic so-
cial system (p. 19). Luhmann thus confines legal autopoiesis to main-
tenance of a code, the integrity of a system of legal communications 
(pp. 25-26, 347). The effects of the code on "nonlegal" actions and 
communications - actual decisions of cases, bargaining in the shadow 
of actual decisions, the content of the normative elements of the code 
- need have no integrity, since they do not affect maintenance of the 
code. The legal system is normatively closed and cognitively open. 
Luhmann solves the subsystem problem quite cleverly by compressing 
law into language - legal communications. Actual decisions, bar-
gaining in the shadow of decisions, the content of norms - everything 
we ordinarily regard as important about legal systems - is not law, 
102. See E. DURKHEIM, DIVISION OF LABOR, supra note 30, at 70-111. 
103. See id. at 10-31. 
104. "The law's autonomy is in danger only when the code itself is in danger - for instance 
when decisions are taken in the legal system itself increasingly according to the difference be· 
tween beneficial and harmful rather than the difference between legal and illegal." P. 347. 
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according to Luhmann, but nonlegal communication and action in the 
form of legal communication. Because Luhmann cannot allow legal 
autopoiesis to "disrupt" the autopoiesis of the social system, he must 
regard law as form only, the legal franking of a nonlegal, autopoietic 
social substance. The positivism of Luhmann's autopoietic law is the 
autonomous code; the social substance the code bears is the natural 
law of the positivism. 
Third, even if one can conceive of an autopoietic subsystem of an 
autopoietic social system, Luhmann's assignment of law to a subsys-
tem bristles with difficulties. 105 Luhmann's argument for an auto-
poietic legal subsystem is empirical: under conditions of functional 
confinement, and only under those conditions, legal communications 
form an autopoietic subsystem, characterized by the autonomy and 
unity of legal communications. The empirical test is whether any so-
cial system in fact compresses law into the autonomous code that 
Luhmann's functionalism requires. If the answer is that no social sys-
tem does, then Luhmann's characterization of the "legal system" as an 
autopoietic subsystem is a deliberate choice freighted with normative 
consequence. We can surmise that Luhmann has exercised this choice 
in order to forward a program of suppressing the role in social theory 
of values and individuals, mediated by norms. Modelling the "legal 
system" as a social subsystem is simply not an option for social theo-
ries that put values and individuals, mediated by norms, at the center. 
The consequence for legal theory of de-centering values and individu-
als is at once positivism and naturalism. The consequence for social 
theory is a reification of legal institutions and an "evolutionary" pref-
erence for the autonomy and unity of legal systems. 
For an empirical test whether functional confinement of the legal 
system is a necessary precondition of its autopoiesis, hence whether 
autonomy is a more important virtue for the legal systems of advanced 
industrial democracies than dynamism, we tum to the legal system of 
our advanced industrial democracy: common law. 
VI. REsPONSE OF A COMMON LAW DENIZEN 
The notion of a self-generating legal system should be familiar to 
lawyers trained in our tradition. Common lawyers are comfortable 
with the thought that the appropriate references for justifying legal 
decisions are prior legal decisions of the same order, and that every 
decision serves as a reference for future decisions. This is not a com-
105. So far as I know, Luhmann is the only major social theorist who assigns the legal system 
to a subsystem of the social system. Luhmann's is clearly the work of a lawyer. Habermas treats 
the legal system as part-system, part-lifeworld. See, e.g., Habermas, Law and Morality, in 8 THE 
TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 251-59 (S. McMurrin ed. 1988) (criticizing Luhmann's 
positivisim and functionalism). 
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plete or sufficiently accurate description of the common law .106 Nev-
ertheless, the common law at least superficially validates some version 
of autopoiesis. It is thus a good candidate for empirical validation of 
Luhmann's insistence on functional confinement of the legal system to 
achieve autopoiesis. 
The conception of a self-generating legal system is as familiar to 
common lawyers as it is bizarre to lawyers trained in the Continental 
traditions of positivism and naturalism. (Luhmann's work should be 
much more radical and surprising to his European colleagues than it is 
to us.) These latter traditions model law on the basis of sciences that 
have no room for self-production. 107 The materials of naturalist or 
positivist systems never trace their origins, as the common law does, to 
materials produced by the system. Positivist or naturalist materials 
ultimately come from outside the legal system proper, through the aus-
pices of legislation or natural reason, which in tum are based upon 
morals and politics, not legal materials. It sometimes seems as if 
Luhmann has used autopoiesis to rework the traditions in which he 
was trained in order to fit a common law model. 
However, with some notable exceptions, such as Karl Llewellyn, 
Americans have been shackled by the absence of an adequate model 
for the common law in positivism and naturalism. The Continental 
tradition has always supplied the "high talk"108 of American jurispru-
dence, the common law, its language of serious business. But positiv-
ism and naturalism are high talk only. They completely miss the 
ceaseless self-generative, hence self-transformative, activity marking 
the common law above any other jurisprudence. Autopoietic law, 
though another import, provides a clearer reflection of our jurispru-
dence than do the older models. Yet Luhmann's functional confine-
ment of autopoietic law does not provide an ab.solutely clear reflection. 
For that we must tinker with autopoietic law using a tradition we have 
lost sight of in modem legal theory: law as revelation. 
My.thesis is twofold. First, any fully autopoietic legal system must 
include the individual as such in the self-generating operations of the 
system. Second, any legal system that puts the individual at the center 
must resort to some version (which we can specify) of law as 
revelation. 109 
106. See infra text accompanying notes 115-19. 
107. See supra text accompanying notes 17-24, 61-66. 
108. See THE VARIORUM EomoN OF THE POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 622 (P. Allt & R. Al-
spach eds. 1957). 
109. Lempert too suggests a critique along these lines. See pp. 166-68, 173-75, 186. He, by 
contrast, prefers to couch the critique in terms of the failure of autopoietic law to provide room 
for legislation. Lempert emphasizes the importance in Anglo-American law of equal access to 
the legal system by individuals and the status neutrality of law among individuals (pp. 166-68), 
but he does not turn these emphases into a critique of Luhmann. Nonetheless, Lempert's version 
and mine are really two sides of the same coin: Luhmann maintains the autopoiesis of legal 
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A. Luhmann 's Invitation 
Though Luhmann's version of autopoietic law does not provide an 
absolutely clear reflection of the common law, Luhmann would never 
claim that it had to. Autopoiesis, first off, is not a model of the com-
mon law alone, but of legal systems in advanced industrial democra-
cies, most of which are not common law systems. Bentham, Hegel, 
Weber - every heavyweight but Hayek who has considered the mat-
ter has found it puzzling that the first industrial economy arose in a 
jurisdiction whose legal system is as barbaric and irrational as the 
common law. The scientific (to Hayek, constructivist and autocratic!) 
codes of Continental legal systems seem to fit the rational-legal re-
quirements of modern enterprise much better. Luhmann could, if he 
wished, join Bentham, Hegel, and Weber by treating the common law 
as an exception to these requirements. 110 
Then there is the matter of method. Luhmann is a scientist; auto-
poietic law is a scientific model in the tradition of Weber. 111 The test 
of such a model, as we should expect of a science of the individual, is 
systems in advanced industrial democracies only by contracting them within a functionally de-
fined subsystem of the social system. P. 174. Only my emphasis differs from Lempert's. 
The link between our approaches is that once one has made individuals into tenants of their 
own legal system, then the law they make as individuals appears only as legislation. The legal 
system necessarily regards legislation as unpredictable, external, foreign. (Ronald Dworkin has 
recently tried to build a bridge between individuals and legislation through his notion of law as 
integrity. See LAW'S EMPIRE 151-275 (1986).) Disseized individuals avenge themselves legisla-
tively upon the legal system in at least three ways. Acting en masse through interest groups they 
enact statutes; as judges they make laws in the guise of deciding cases; they make contracts as 
personal legislation. 
I prefer to couch the critique in terms of the absence of individuals rather than legislation, 
because I believe it brings us closer to understanding a real dynamic underlying modem legal 
systems that sociologists of law (not fo mention legal theorists) have neglected. Though we can 
mince words on the subject, it is best to treat this dynamic in terms of its purest and most explicit 
historical expression, which is revelation. See infra text accompanying notes 121-22. · 
110. I am on Hayek's team. He answers the "English question" of political economy by 
exploring the exact means by which the common law supported the expll!lsion of industry. See 2 
F. VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY 107-32 (1976). 
Weber understood and respected the common law as a political phenomenon, but did not, so' 
far as I know, grasp its connection with the development of the English economy in the century 
following the Bubble Act (1720). See M. GOULD, supra note 90, at 430 n.4. The Bubble Act cut 
firms off from their formal connection with the sovereign through the regulated company, driv-
ing them into a common law underground, which became the modem law of associations. See 
Jacobson, The Private Use of Public Authority: Sovereignty and Associations in the Common Law, 
29 BUfFALO L. REv. 599, 11t 662 (1980). Weber looked to the "Protestant ethic" rather than tp 
law for a transformation in patterns of capital accumulation. The formula is: , the common law is 
unpredictable (unlike scientific legal systems), capitalistic enterprise requires a predictable legal 
system, the common law hindered rather than helped the development of capitalistic enterprise. 
Hayek turns the formula upside-down: scientific legal systems may be predictable (often as not 
they are wildly capricious), but their very "predictability" stifles enterprise. 
Ask Wall Street entrepreneurs whether they favor "predictable" legislation and administra-
tion of financial transactions out of Washington over those last re.lies of the eighteenth-century 
English corporate bar sitting quietly in Wilmington, Delaware. See generally Bratton, The New 
Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. - (1989) 
(forthcoming). 
111. See M. WEBER, supra note 37. See also supra text accoi:ii-panying notes 34-37. 
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whether it helps disinterested observers "understand" the world in 
which people think they live, so that decisions they make, together or 
separately, appear meaningful or rational to the observers. The ob-
servers' understanding must, in tum, be comprehensible to the people 
observed, but may not simply restate their self-understanding. The 
understanding must be an observation that the observed receive with 
their own understanding. (Here social science mimics natural science, 
where the test of validity is universal agreement on the basis of com-
mon observations. The difference is that universal agreement in social 
science includes agreement of the object being observed.) The ob-
served's understanding of the observers' understanding will have fresh 
insights (about observers too!), requiring fresh efforts of understand-
ing.112 Also, the self-knowledge the observed obtain in cooperation 
with the observers may lead to changes in the way the observed carry 
on their lives, requiring further cooperative efforts of understanding, 
and so forth. 113 
The application of autopoiesis to the common law passes Weber's 
test with flying colors. Luhmann uses autopoiesis to understand in a 
fresh way the fact that legal systems in advanced industrial democra-
cies are at least partly self-referential, and the references of these sys-
tems are never fixed, but constantly changing. We denizens of 
common law systems understand in our own way Luhmann's under-
standing. Autopoietic law need not be a perfect reflection of the com-
mon law to pass Weber's test, only a recognizable one, and Luhmann's 
reflection is certainly recognizable. 
A recognizable reflection of a social phenomenon, according to 
Weberian science, invites the denizens of the phenomenon to respond 
to the understanding. Let us accept Luhmann's invitation. He has 
suggested an insightful understanding of the legal systems of advanced 
industrial democracies that we common law denizens can understand. 
The common law strives (in a manner we shall have to pin down) to be 
112. This will, in tum, lead to self-knowledge on the part of the observer and further self-
knowledge on the part of the observed. Readers will recognize this as Habennas' integration of 
Freud's and Weber's scientific methods. See J. HABERMAS, supra note 30, at 261-62, 292 (1971). 
113. Social science, Luhmann notes, has its own autopoiesis. Pp. 347-48. 
The grand alternative to Habennas' synthesis of Freud's and Weber's conversational method 
stems from Marx. Marx's methodology retains allegiance to the Baconian tradition of experi-
mental science - an effort to isolate the "laws of motion of capitalism" through the coincidence 
of a theoretical.and an empirical act of will. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22. The 
danger, of course, of retaining allegiance to the methodology of mechanism is that it will slide 
into positivism. Marx's early writings maintained an allegiance to the other tradition of scientific 
knowing before the modem sciences of the individual: the observational method of species sci-
ence (his notion of "species being"). Mark Gould has argued that Marx avoids positivism (and 
thus retains the species commitment of his early writings) by insisting on proper experimental 
conditions for attaining knowledge in social science. Gould describes the conditions in which 
valid social knowledge is possible as those of an "equitable society." The equivalent of an "ex-
periment" from this point of view is, of course, political action. See M. GOULD, supra note 90, at 
xvii-xviii. 
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self-referential, and the common law constantly engages in self-
transformation. 
B. A Common Law Model 
Luhmann's account of autopoietic law does not show that he un-
derstands the exact manner in which the common law is self-referen-
tial. (Perhaps he has not tried.) It also does not show that he 
understands the reason the common law constantly engages in self-
transformation. (He should want to know.) Luhmann may not un-
derstand these matters, I suggest, because he has not freed himself 
from the positivist and naturalist orientations his tradition requires. 
As a probable consequence of his dependency on physical or natu-
ralistic models, Luhmann misses the method and motor of common 
law self-generativity: the role of individuals - ordinary legal persons 
- in generating legal norms, and the need of individuals to keep trans-
forming them. It is probable (though not certain) that inclusion of 
individuals in a model of law prohibits the functional confinement of 
law to a subsystem of the social system. Thus the common law exhib-
its an expansive, world-filling dynamism constantly pressing to break 
the bounds of functional confinement.114 
The difficulties Luhmann faces may not be endemic to autopoietic 
law, but only to Luhmann's use of it to respond to the peculiar 
(though widespread) concerns of his own tradition. Luhmann may 
have committed the noblest sin of social science: constructing an illu-
minating ideal type of a general phenomenon (the legal systems of ad-
vanced industrial democracies) and confusing the general 
phenomenon with a particular version of it. But the best social scien-
tists, like Luhmann, commit sins precisely in order to have denizens 
correct them. 
The common law reflection of autopoietic law starts from the no-
tion of law in common law systems.115 The common law regards the 
legal norm as a compendium of applications of the norm by individuals 
in ordinary interactions. (An anchor of the idea that law is application 
is the doctrine of precedent: legal norms cannot exist apart from spe-
cific applications.) Law as application is a profound and far-reaching 
notion with four immediate consequences. 
First, one who wishes to know a legal norm can start knowing it 
only by studying prior applications of the norm. Thus, reports of 
114. See Jacobson, Legal Plenum, supra note 12. The common law is one of three dynamic 
jurisprudences, sharing a host of characteristics that set them against the two static jurispru-
dences, positivism and natural law. The most striking characteristic of the dynamic jurispru-
dences is that, unlike positivism and naturalism, they do not require a stable correlation of rights 
with duties. They are "correlation-breaking." For a full account of the differences, see id. at 
879-83. 
115. For a more elaborate account of these ideas, see id. at 886-91, 902-06. 
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cases, not black-letter rules, are the first place to look for rights and 
obligations. Cases sometimes state "rules," but rules are not norms, 
only a way of talking about the formulation of norms in cases. The 
norm is the rule-anchored-in-cases. A rule applied in a prior case was 
the rule for that case, and the doctrine of precedent demands only that 
it be considered in subsequent applications. 
Second, one can know a legal norm completely only once one has 
completed one's own application. Common law norms are the proce-
dure for their own application. The legal norm is procedurally thick 
and substantively indeterminate. To know the norm one must study a 
book of cases rather than a treatise setting forth general statements. 
The legal norm thus changes as those who are applying it in transac-
tions proceed with their application. At the beginning of a relation-
ship the "rule" component of the norm may be all the guidance law 
can or should supply to the parties in the relationship. The relation-
ship itself is of a level of abstraction coordinate with the rule. As the 
relationship evolves, the fullness of prior applications of the norm be-
come more relevant to the parties, precisely because their own applica-
tion has more materials to compare to prior applications. 
Third, the legal norm is the product of the prior applications and 
the present application. Hence the norm must change with every fresh 
application. Every application, no matter how routine, must be added 
to the book of cases. Even an application "on all fours" with prior 
applications contains the valuable information that the norm has not 
changed despite changes in the world since the prior applications. 
Fourth, the legal norm may change only in certain directions in 
the fresh application. The common law constraint on changes in 
norms stems from an overriding common law norm that derives from 
the definition of law as application. Individuals using norms to con-
duct relationships must not behave as if the rule-component of the 
norm protects them, no matter how bad the consequences. 116 Individ-
uals must apply the norm as if the application is reciprocal. 117 Judges, 
after all, are at least partly free to change the rule component of the 
norm. 118 Even if they do not, judges and juries may disappoint ab-
116 .. We traditionally classify the revisionary power of the common law under the rubric of 
"equity." Though equity and law were institutionally separate in common law jurisdictions (and 
still are in some), the influence of equity on co'mmon law courts has always been profound. Since 
the joinder of equity and law, the revisionary power has unambiguously been the province of 
common law judges. I do not believe, in any case, that the development of a separate equity 
jurisdiction in the Middle Ages was adventitious. The English legal system included both equity 
and law, and I refer to the entire system as the common law. 
117. Lest Luhmann complain that my account of reciprocity in the common law constitutes 
a naturalistic "super-norm" (p. 18), I emphasize that reciprocity flows from the definition of law 
in common law systems as application. In any case, Luhmann himselfbases the legal theory inA 
Sociological Theory of Law, supra note 44, hence by implication in his autopoietic works, on the 
notion of reciprocity contained in the conception, "expectations of expectations" - a naturalistic 
super-norm underpinning Luhmann's positivism. See also supra note 95. 
118. Anthony D'Amato, in a remarkable prefiguration of Luhmann's work in autopoiesis, 
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stract a priori predictions about the application of the norm. Individu-
als must always impress judge and jury that they have the character of 
acting reciprocally in their dealings. Respect for the latent rights of 
individuals who appear to be losers under the rule-component of a 
norm is an essential component of that character. 
C. Common Law Autopoiesis 
The model of the common law as application suggests a motor for 
the ceaseless self-transformation of legal norms in common law juris-
dictions. The same motor almost certainly applies generally to the 
legal systems of advanced industrial democracies. The common law 
motor - the need of individuals as moral beings to engage in constant 
transformation of law defined as application - supplies a more satis-
factory explanation for the perpetual motion and transformation of 
legal systems than Luhmann's, which reduces to tautology rescued by 
utilitarian functionalism .. 
The model also suggests the exact manner in which the common 
law is self-referential. The norm includes orientations toward the 
norm of each individual applying it. Common law self reference re-
quires reference to the selves disclosing themselves through prior appli-
cations. This latter reflection, I suspect, is less clearly responsive to 
Luhmann's model in terms that would be useful or meaningful to the-
orists working in his tradition. Only they can say. 
The role and needs of the individual in common law systems link 
the motor of transformation in the common law with the manner in 
which the common law is self-referential. Luhmann's focus on auton-
omy and order misleads him into eliminating or suppressing the role 
of the individual in autopoiesis. The elements of autopoiesis in his 
model are legal communications; the elements in common law, individ-
uals revealing themselves in norm application (understood as norm cre-
ation). Because Luhmann focuses on the autonomy of legal systems 
and the contribution of legal systems to order, he contracts the legal 
system within the social system to the point where the individual as 
such is not a recognizable part of it. Inasmuch as individuals figure in 
Luhmann's model, they are the weak ones· of utilitarian dogma, 
designed only to support the functional contraction of the legal sys-
tem. The common law both serves and breeds very different sorts of 
individuals. 
The realm of the social does not disappear in the common law 
has described the pragmatic restraints on judges' freedom. D' Amato argues that the popular 
perception of the Realist formula, that law is what the official in charge of enforcing it will do, 
needs correction. The enforcing official will pay close attention to the predictions of what she 
will do, since to depart surprisingly from the predictions would diminish her power. Hence the 
correct formula is that of Holmes: law (for judges as well as lawyers) is a prediction of what the 
judge will do. See D'Amato, The Limits of Legal Realism, 81 YALE L.J. 468 (1978). 
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simply because the common law underscores the fate and needs of in-
dividuals. First, individuals figure in the common law only in the 
character they display through interaction oriented toward the values 
expressed in prior applications of norms. The individuals applying 
norms may have hosts of attitudes (personality, emotion) toward the 
application. The attitudes do not matter: only the display of character 
in interaction matters. 
Second, the prior applications of norms to which individuals orient 
themselves necessarily include the characters expressed by other indi-
viduals in exemplary interactions. These prior expressions of charac-
ter are themselves orientations toward values expressed through 
interaction. Hence the individual looking toward prior applications 
necessarily orients herself toward values expressed in prior applica-
tions. The values remain values, even though they include references 
to character. 
Third, the overall orientation of persons living in common law sys-
tems - reducing the uncertainty of the application of norms through 
reciprocity of application - creates communities of norm application, 
congeries of persons conspiring to set parameters of application. The 
common law frees individuals to form partial and shifting communi-
ties defined by the mutual interest of individuals in specifying law 
(construed as application) for these communities. The common law 
sets up parameters of interaction under which individuals have an in-
terest in constructing communities. The "social" in the common law 
appears as community, not structure. 
Common law jurisprudence is not the only jurisprudence under-
scoring the fate and needs of individuals as members of communities. 
The common law interest in individuality - the display of character 
in interaction - is not the only possible interest. Other sorts of juris-
prudence historically have emphasized different interests in individual-
ity with a different vision of the social associated with each interest. 
One interest, for example, has been the self-perfection of individuals, 
usually found in jurisprudences emphasizing the duties of legal per-
sons over their rights. The vision of the social associated with the 
interest of self-perfection is the cult, the society of members united in a 
quest for self-perfection. Another interest has been the liberation of 
individuals, emphasizing the rights of legal persons over their du-
ties.119 The vision of the social associated with liberation is the associ-
ation of property owners united by mutual recognition of right. These 
other interests are certainly found alongside common law jurispru-
dence in the American legal system. For example, American constitu-
tional law emphasizes the interest of liberation. Nonetheless, the 
common law makes only one interest and its associated vision of the 
119. See Benson, Abstract Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Con· 
tract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1077 (1989). 
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social thematic: the display of character in interaction and communi-
ties of norm application.120 
The specific vision of the social in the common law does not at all 
support Luhmann's distinction between normative and cognitive. The 
distinction is not even theoretically conceivable, which is the most 
Luhmann claims for it. Every normative reference absolutely requires 
cognition of the behavior of the legal person applying the norm in 
interaction. Every cognition of action is steeped in normative refer-
ence. The institutions of the common law facilitating this absolute 
unity of the normative and cognitive are quite elaborate, and bear 
careful scrutiny. The contributions of the jury, for example, have been 
inestimably important in warding off the tendencies of bureaucratic 
legal personnel to degrade the common law to a mixture of positivism 
and naturalism. The struggle over the directed verdict is only one pro-
cedural manifestation of the battle against the degradation of the com-
mon law. The jury has also undoubtedly stiffened the resolve of the 
bureaucratic personnel to use equitable criteria even where litigants do 
not have a right to trial by jury. Another example is the extraordinary 
success of constitutionalism in the United States and Great Britain, 
which almost certainly depends on a substructure of common law liti-
gation and a common law understanding of the nature of right. These 
examples, unfortunately, exceed the scope of this essay. 
The emphasis in the common law, which is at once intensely indi-
vidualistic and communal, is more likely to support the operations of 
advanced industrial democracies than legal systems whose structure 
opposes amoral, want-seeking creatures to a social structure function-
ally designed to funnel and bridle the depraved activities of these crea-
tures. The first modern industrial system did not arise in a common 
law jurisdiction by accident. 
D. Common Law Revelation 
Neither Luhmann nor the common lawyers have been without 
materials in the very core of Western jurisprudence with which to un-
derstand the role and needs of individuals as such in legal systems. 
Though neither positivism nor naturalism does the job, Luhmann's 
tradition, in common with ours, offers a third model of law, law as 
revelation, in which the role and needs of individuals as such are cen-
tral. Revelatory law is a model that legal theorists and sociologists 
have tried very hard to ignore, but it is worth understanding in the 
interests of science. Only the revelatory tradition, not positivism or 
naturalism, contains strong models of individuals that help us under-
stand the motor and method of common law self-generativity. 
120. For a more elaborate account of the three individualist jurisprudences, see Jacobson, 
Legal Plenum, supra note 12. 
1686 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1647 
The notion of revelation- God speaking directly to (or through) 
a legal person (or persons)-is a crucial element of all historical legal 
systems, and the science-based legal theories we have seen so far, in-
cluding Luhmann's version of autopoietic law, can be an accurate de-
scription only of a legal system that ruthlessly eliminates all forms of 
revelation. ·None does. The theorists of legal autopoiesis, like virtu-
ally all their scientific forebears, are guilty of the Enlightenment crime 
of excessively hating religion, to the degree that they refuse to theorize 
it. 121 Hence they have failed to recognize revelatory moments in ordi-
nary, modern, nonreligious legal systems - God (properly defined) 
speaking to or through legal persons one way or another. 
What is at stake in the banishment of revelation from the scientific 
approach to law is the career of the individual. Though autopoiesis 
gives the individual more of a role in the legal system than either posi-
tivism or natural law, the legal person of autopoiesis very much re-
mains either a want-choosing cipher as in mechanism, or the bearer or 
instrument of the system as in the old biology of species. A strong 
doctrine of individualism must have reference to some form of revela-
tion - God speaking to or through persons. The consequence of not 
taking seriously or recognizing the revelatory moment in legal systems 
is that Luhmann's construction of autopoietic law lacks a strong doc-
trine of individuals, which the common law, in common with a wide 
range of both secular and religious legal systems, at once cultivates 
and requires. 
The ordinary meaning of revelation requires some version of God 
speaking directly to (or through) a legal person (or persons). I accept 
the ordinary meaning, with the caveat that it is incumbent upon the 
receiver of revelation to say what she means by "God." The social 
study of religion as ideology, invented by Hegel in his Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion 122 and elaborated by Weber in The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 123 picks up the thread of analysis 
where the "believer" stops saying what she means. Sociology can then 
trace the value-neutral, analytic continuation of terms left undefined 
by doctrine back into the heart of doctrine. Thus reworked, the soci-
ologist is able to understand the relations between doctrine as an ex-
121. Not all have been guilty, however. Montesquieu, whose relations with the Enlighten-
ment were ambivalent, to say the least, invented the sociological method of spirit ("esprit'? pre-
cisely in order to use Enlightenment techniques to study the worlds created by religions. Hegel 
fashioned Montesquieu's discovery into a powerful analytic tool of general applicability in his 
Phenomenology of Spirit ("Geist" is "esprit'?. Hegel's intricate studies of the worlds created by 
spirit (or ideology, in Marx's view) are scientifically unsurpassed. See, e.g .. G.W.F. HEGEL, The 
Spirit of Christianity and its Fate (Geist des Christentums und Ihre Schicksa/}, in EARLY THEO-
LOGICAL WRmNGS, 182-301 (1948). 
122. G.W.F. HEGEL, LECTURES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION (P. Hodgon ed. 1984) 
(first published in 1832). 
123. M. WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (1958) (first 
published as DIE PROTESTANTISIHE ETHIK UNO DER GEIST DES KAPITALISMUS in 1904-1905). 
May 1989] Autopoietic Law 1687 
pression of values and the system of interaction instantiating the 
values. 
American jurisprudence has overt revelatory moments, such as the 
doctrine of the Founders in constitutional law. 124 Judicial discretion 
also resembles revelation - the reference of a decision to the "feel" or 
"temperament" of the decisionmaker, rather than to a series of prior 
decisions. 125 My thesis does not depend on these. Covert revelation is 
embedded in the structure of common law pragmatics: the status of 
the person vis-a-vis the norm and the norm vis-a-vis the person. 
Norms are revealed to decisionmakers through ordinary interaction 
(ordinary persons too are decisionmakers ). The source of revelation is 
character manifest in interaction; the text of revelation is case law, 
understood as a record of exemplary interactions. Common law reve-
lation thus has two moments: the orientation toward the norm of each 
individual applying it, and the reference in the norm to the selves dis-
closing themselves in prior applications. Revelation can thus be found 
in the focus of the common law on the individual case and in the char-
acter of persons making each case individual. 
CONCLUSION 
One may trace the casuistic and explanatory inadequacies of 
Luhmann's version of autopoietic law to one of two sources. Either 
scientific models themselves cannot fully convey the potential of law 
for governing human relationships or the autopoietic lawyers have not 
sufficiently mastered the epistemologicaJ subtleties of the new science 
from which they draw their model. I am not sure which is the case, 
since the new sciences of biology, psychology, and physics today are 
themselves similarly affiicted by terrible uncertainty. 
One point is clear. If Luhmann wishes to be consistent with the 
methodological premises of autopoiesis, he should not want to claim 
validity for autopoietic law on the ground that it describes some legal 
system somewhere, just as the common law describes a possible legal 
system.126 The validity that rests on the description of possible facts is 
positivist validity. Luhmann's step away from positivism aims to 
place ·the model of autopoietic law within an evolutionary framework. 
Autopoietic law appears only after the social system has evolved suffi-
cient functional differentiation to support an autonomous autopoietic 
legal subsystem. The model of autopoietic law thus becomes possible 
124. See s. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH passim (1988). 
125. See Yablon, Justifying the Judge's Hunch: An Essay on Discretion (1989) (unpublished 
manuscript); cf. Weisberg, Judicial Discretion, or the Self on the Shelf, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 105, 
107-08 (1988) (applauding Justice Brennan's credo that the judge necessarily instantiates per-
sonal values in decisions). 
126. Karl-Heinz Ladeur's extremely rich paper explores this theme. See pp. 242-82. See 
also supra note 50. Like Patrick Nerhot, Ladeur would be delighted by the common law. See 
supra note 16. 
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at a certain moment in the evolution of the social system. Luhmann's 
general model of law includes all possible forms of the legal system, 
each appropriate to a different stage of social evolution. Luhmann 
thus anchors his positivism in a naturalistic evolutionary framework, 
where one observes (as in all naturalisms) all possible legal systems 
spread out over evolutionary time.121 
Luhmann's recourse to naturalism in order to rescue autopoietic 
law from positivism misconstrues the method of the modem sciences 
of the individual. The conversation that is at the heart of that method 
requires that all possible legal systems be possible at one moment, not 
just in retrospect spread out over evolutionary time. Indeed such 
evolution as there may be favors increasing the instantiation of possi-
ble legal systems at a single moment. 
Luhmann's methodology has the consequence that any single legal 
system he describes instantiates only one characteristic, such as auton-
omy. Either a legal system is the differentiated subsystem of a highly 
evolved social system - the sophisticated autopoietic law of an ad-
vanced industrial democracy - or it is a primitive, fundamentalist 
legal system coordinate with the entire social system. The legal system 
cannot be both at once. 
Yet real modem legal systems exhibit all sorts of characteristics 
that, in principle, contradict each other. The American legal system 
uses the common law in some moments; it is positivist at other mo-
ments. It uses still other forms of jurisprudence we have only just 
begun to fathom. It is likely that no one model accurately describes 
any real legal system. Instead, one must look to the models as differ-
ent expressions of values every legal system must at least consider. If a 
legal system insists on expressing only one value to the exclusion of 
others, then the others avenge themselves upon the jurisprudence of 
that system in the form of dilemmas, exceptions, and threats to the 
integrity of the system.12s 
Every legal system must principally reckon with dynamism, be-
cause every legal system must fulfill different and often conflicting 
goals and values, including the welter of values glossed by the notion 
of individuality. The model of the common law is superior to 
Luhmann's model of an autopoietic legal system only if it more suc-
cessfully reckons with dynamism. The energy that some legal systems 
pour into remaining static does not create stasis, only dynamism in 
forms the legal system cannot use or comprehend. 
Not every contributor to Autopoietic Law is as concerned as 
Luhmann with the value of autonomy. Not a single contributor, in-
127. I owe the thought about evolutionary time to a private conversation with Drucilla 
Cornell. 
128. See, e.g., J. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 503 (1968) (recourse to the case 
method in Continental systems). 
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eluding Luhmann, is content to sacrifice the dynamism of autopoietic 
law to positivism and naturalism. The book is a testament to the inter-
est legal theorists all over the world are showing in dynamic jurispru-
dence, and the relations of dynamic jurisprudence to individuality and 
community. Autopoietic law sharpens our understanding of these new 
and exciting prospects in legal theory, though it comes to us burdened 
with the special problems and perspectives of Luhmann's tradition. 
We have our own special problems and perspectives. Any Ameri-
can reader who has a "conversation" with the essays in Teubner's col-
lection will better understand the problems and perspectives of our 
tradition, and the enhanced possibilities for all traditions that modem 
legal theory is creating. 
